The National Intelligence Model
The National Intelligence Model brings all the best practices in intelligence-led policing together, offering a blueprint for those who wish to develop better their ability to answer critical questions about strategy and tactics. It offers, for the first time, the realisable goal of integrated intelligence in which all forces might play a part in a system bigger than themselves. I believe it will become a major contributor to the continuing professionalisation of law-enforcement intelligence and have a major impact on the way we do our business.

John Abbott, QPM
Director General, National Criminal Intelligence Service

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Over the last few years, police activity has shifted its centre of balance away from reactive investigation after events, towards targeting active criminals on the basis of intelligence. We have invested much in developing new intelligence practices and skills in analysis. Intelligence usually means making inferences from large amounts of data. This process is only possible if we can mix and match information across the board. To this end, it is essential that common standards and discipline attach to the intelligence process. Aside from professionalising police efforts to target local criminals, we should be able to aggregate the national picture in a much more informative way. The evaluation of this programme is one of the main planks to the ACPO Crime strategy.

David Phillips, QPM
Chairman of the Crime Committee, Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales and Northern Ireland and Chief Constable of Kent County Constabulary
The Availability of Information on the National Intelligence Model

Welcome to this explanation of the National Intelligence Model.

To explain the structure and detail of the National Intelligence Model, NCIS has produced this book and a CD-ROM. The book and the CD-ROM are intended to be used together but if you have received this book without the CD-ROM, we believe you will still find that this provides a detailed explanation of the Model.

If you have not received a CD-ROM with this book and you would like a copy, please contact NCIS Corporate Communications:

Tel: +44 (0) 20 7238 8431
Email: press@spring9.demon.co.uk

The CD-ROM

The CD-ROM contains three products:

- A presentation of the model using graphics, video and voice-over
- A PowerPoint presentation (which is downloadable for use when talking about the use of the model in discussion or training groups)
- A full graphical explanation using point and click (this explanation may be run either from the CD-ROM drive or downloaded to the hard drive of a Personal Computer).

This provides the highest level of detail

System requirements for the CD-ROM

You require a Pentium Class IBM Compatible PC with an SVGA Monitor (800 x 600 pixels) set at 16 bit colour or better; 24 Speed CD-ROM drive.

To hear the video/voice over presentation, a sound card will be required. However, no additional software is needed.

To download the PowerPoint presentation, you will require Microsoft PowerPoint 97 or newer. Alternatively, it can be run from the CD-ROM using the built-in viewer.

To run the full graphical explanation, no additional software is required. This is included on the CD-ROM. You will require 20MB of space on your Hard Drive if you choose to download it. You can, however, run it direct from the CD-ROM. Once loaded the graphical presentation is run in the following manner:

Basic Operation

Movement between pages is carried out by clicking with the left mouse button on hotlinks. The location of these can be seen where the cursor changes from an arrow to a hand.

Hotlinks are located in three areas within each screen:

- The buttons of the toolbar at the top of the screen
- The navigation arrow(s) at the foot of the screen
- Certain specified areas of the Model itself in the body of the screen

To enter the Model from the Home Page, select Level 1, 2 or 3 from the top toolbar. Then proceed by following the required hotlinks.

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To exit the Model, return to the Home Page, select the ‘EXIT’ button in the bottom left corner of the screen and then ‘EXIT’ again on the Title screen.

Main Toolbar

According to the level of the page currently being displayed, the appropriate level button in the main toolbar will be highlighted in pink.

- Pressing a HIGHLIGHTED level button will return to the overview page for that level
- Pressing a NON-HIGHLIGHTED level button will display the equivalent page to that being currently displayed for another level

The ‘JUMP’ button allows direct access to the main pages in the model using its page reference number. This facility is particularly intended for trainers who might need to go to a particular page during groups discussions.

These instructions are also included in the Help file within the graphical explanation.

Running the CD-ROM

Insert the CD in your CD-ROM drive and the CD should self-start. Follow the instructions on screen.

If the CD does not self-start – in Windows click ‘Start’ and then select ‘Run’ from the menu.

The ‘Run’ dialogue box will open. Type in the following: D:/model.exe (where ‘D’ is the drive letter for your CD-ROM drive), click on ‘OK’ and the CD will start and take you to the menu.

(You are advised to turn off any screen savers before running the CD-Rom)

If you have trouble running the CD-ROM, advice will be available Monday to Fridays, 9am to 5pm from the NCIS Corporate Development Branch (tel: +44 (0) 20 7238 8095).

“

The National Intelligence Model was initially thought to be a Crime Intelligence Model and so NCIS was referred to our committee. Yes, it is superb for crime matters but it can offer so much to other aspects of operational policing too. We have no doubts that the model offers a Best Value approach to tackling our core functions.”

Alan Buck
Chairman of the Crime Advisory Committee,
Superintendents’ Association

"
The National Intelligence Model – why?

The National Intelligence Model is the product of work led by the National Criminal Intelligence Service on behalf of the Crime Committee of the Association of Chief Police Officers. Research, design and testing of the model has been completed by police officers, analysts and intelligence specialists from a number of police forces and agencies. It represents the collected wisdom and best practice in intelligence-led policing and law enforcement.

The Model provides important opportunities for law enforcement managers whether from the Police Service or another law enforcement agency. Whilst, therefore, the Model has a very specific benefit for the Police Service in providing clarity and standards for intelligence work for Chief Police Officers and operational commanders, a number of other law enforcement agencies have identified how the model can enable them to review intelligence systems and introduce more rigour into the management decision-making processes for both strategic and tactical purposes. Acceptance of the basic precepts of the model by other agencies will greatly aid the effort to ‘join up’ law enforcement activity.

The Model provides the picture that drives effective strategy, not just about crime and criminals, but for all law enforcement needs from organised crime to road safety. It is capable of use in relation to new or emerging problems within a force or operational command unit; to provide the strategic and operational focus to force, organisation or local command unit business planning. For Police Forces it has particular current application as it delivers the intelligence and analysis which is the basis of the Crime and Disorder Act audits and can serve the community intelligence requirements of ‘Winning the Race’.

This work is the outcome of a desire to professionalise the intelligence discipline within law enforcement. Intelligence has lagged behind investigation in the codification of best practice, professional knowledge and in the identification of selection and training requirements of staff. It is also recognition of the changing requirements of law enforcement managers which highlights three particular needs:

- To plan and work in co-operation with partners to secure community safety
- To manage performance and risk
- To account for budgets

The National Intelligence Model gives such managers, individually and collectively, the framework for achieving that end. In the Police context, it sets the requirements for the contribution of patrolling, reactive, proactive and intelligence staff.

For the Police Service, the standards of the Model are the intelligence standards endorsed by ACPO and ACPOS. It does not necessarily present a major implementation problem; much of what is described is probably being done. In many cases, it may be about realigning existing resources and procedures to achieve maximum effectiveness rather than the launching of a comprehensive new initiative.
The National Intelligence Model – what is it?

The model has been designed to impact at three levels of business: local, cross border and serious and organised crime:

- **Level 1** – Local issues – usually the crimes, criminals and other problems affecting a basic command unit or small force area. The scope of the crimes will be wide ranging from low value thefts to great seriousness such as murder. The handling of volume crime will be a particular issue at this level.

- **Level 2** – Cross Border issues – usually the actions of a criminal or other specific problems affecting more than one basic command unit. Problems may affect a group of basic command units, neighbouring forces or a group of forces. Issues will be capable of resolution by Forces, perhaps with support from the National Crime Squad, HM Customs and Excise, the National Criminal Intelligence Service or other national resources. Key issues will be the identification of common problems, the exchange of appropriate data and the provision of resources for the common good.

- **Level 3** – Serious and Organised Crime – usually operating on a national and international scale, requiring identification by proactive means and response primarily through targeting operations by dedicated units and a preventative response on a national basis.

The description of these three levels of business is not intended to suggest that criminals operate at three levels. Our position on that point is that criminals clearly operate at two levels, firstly crimes that directly impact upon a community as described in Level 1; secondly those operating at a serious and organised crime level where the key components are the existence of a group of individuals which persists from serious crime to serious crime, an ability to defend the groups, and survive and reform after disruption.

The hand of serious and organised crime will not be so obvious within the community. It will nevertheless be present in the form of the availability of illicit commodities or the underlying causes of more obvious criminality.

Level 2 – Cross Border issues – is included in the model because not all criminality and related issues can be successfully tackled by law enforcement activity in Levels 1 and 3. Intelligence action is essential on at least two issues: one, that not all crimes committed within a law enforcement jurisdiction will be committed by individuals living or working within that same jurisdiction – hence mechanisms for access to and exchange of intelligence are crucial; two, that patterns of activity of certain (probably lower volume) crimes cannot be successfully identified without a higher level exchange and analysis of data – it follows that an acceptance of responsibility for aggregation and analysis of data by one jurisdiction for the benefit of a number who share a common problem is essential. The benefits of the standardisation of intelligence products through adherence to the standards of the model will be obvious.

If however, an agency is structured on a basis that does not require Level 2, the national intelligence model can operate quite satisfactorily on Levels 1 and 3. Indeed, the principles operate quite satisfactorily and effectively in one level operating alone. Significant benefits accrue when there is a standardisation of products and activities within agencies which operate at more than one level. See ‘Links between the Levels’ later in this book.

At each of these levels, the processes and nature of the products are essentially identical, although, of course, the detailed content of the intelligence products and the nature of the...
data to be accessed and processed will vary. This similarity throughout the model occurs naturally but is deliberately highlighted to broaden understanding amongst professionals working at different levels of business.

The Model comprises four prime components which are fundamental to achieving the objective of moving from ‘the business’ to ‘the outcomes’:

- The Tasking and Co-ordinating Process
- Four key Intelligence Products
- Knowledge Products, and
- System Products

The Tasking and Co-ordinating Process takes account of the business planning needs in the context of governmental and local objectives, performance management issues and business excellent. It achieves its purpose by three activities:

- Tasking and co-ordination group meetings – they are chaired by a senior manager of the command unit who has the authority to deploy the necessary resources and comprise of people with key functional responsibility for the planning and execution of the law enforcement effort.
- Production of the intelligence products – the creation of the intelligence products requires the same commitment to resources and direction from the tasking and co-ordination group as the drive for intelligence capability. Whilst there are only four key intelligence products – strategic assessments, tactical assessments, target profiles and problem profiles – their breadth is very extensive.
- Prioritisation of intelligence work – a major responsibility of the tasking and co-ordination group is to resource, direct and sustain intelligence capability. For intelligence work to be fully effective, it needs adequate assets and disciplines which ensure that intelligence activity follows the identified strategic and tactical priorities.

To enable the tasking and co-ordinating process, knowledge products and system products underpin the work. Knowledge products are a range of products, either national or local...
which define the rules for the conduct of the business or the best practice by which skilled processes are completed. They contribute to the corpus of professional knowledge on how components within the model operate. System products are enabling facilities for the collection, reception, recording, storage and use of information. They provide the means by which data is held, retrieved and analysed. Identification of such system products will lead to the gradual elimination of multiple IS platforms and broader networking of independently held datasets. The drive for standardisation in all components and levels of the model will bring ‘integrated intelligence’ within reach and significantly reduce the costs of data collection and aggregation at cross border or national level.

All these elements are crucial if the process is to work. There must be a properly functioning tasking and co-ordination group, intelligence work (both the collection and analysis) must be properly organised and directed, and all four key intelligence products must be delivered and used.
Business Planning and Business Benefits – using the model

The law enforcement business is about the successful management and reduction of crime and other law enforcement problems. It involves identifying and limiting the activities of volume criminals and dangerous offenders, controlling disorder and tackling the many problems that adversely affect community safety and the quality of life.

The specific outcomes required are improved community safety, reduced crime rates and the control of criminality and disorder.

Intelligence lies at the heart of business planning where account is taken of local and governmental objectives, of required levels of performance and of value for money principles. The vital central ingredient in successful business planning is information and understanding on five issues:

- an accurate picture of the business
- what is actually happening on the ground
- the nature and extent of the problems
- the trends
- where the main threats lie

In the model, this overview is one of the standard intelligence products and is called the ‘strategic intelligence assessment’. Without such a product, business planning cannot have the required focus to permit the accurate judgements that are necessary to set priorities and commit resources. More detail on this product and its use are described in the sections on the Tasking and Co-ordination Meeting and the Production of Intelligence Products.

The model delivers many other business benefits.

- The work of the tasking and co-ordinating process depends on the four key intelligence products. These enable management decision making and the operations that follow. Standardisation of the range of intelligence products permits their aggregation into a clearer, wider picture, not obscured by force or agency, internal or external boundaries. Such standardisation does not hinder the very local or bespoke information that is required
- Sound business planning provides for effective strategies and better tactical choices. In turn this promotes more efficient tasking and deployment of resources leading to better value for money as the most important targets can be tackled first
- The Crime and Disorder Act requirements are more easily met and sit more naturally within the business of the command unit. Local problems can be comprehensively described and accurately assessed
- Compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights is secured. The target profiling and risk analysis disciplines applied within the model to the selection of targets helps in establishing ‘proportionality’ and the management of risks and duties of care
- The model can be applied to the whole range of problems confronting a law enforcement agency included, for example, the current concerns about the effective management of racially motivated offences and other community tensions. The National Intelligence Model is not solely concerned with criminal problems but with operational decision-making which is relevant to all areas of law enforcement: crime, disorder and community safety
IT developments require maximum returns on investments. A major benefit of the National Intelligence Model is that it constitutes a tested framework for the evaluation and planning of IT investments. In short, it provides the intelligence business case for IT and has the potential to maximise the use of established national systems such as the DNA database and NAFIS by making the data available to a wider range of applications.

The Model provides, too, the information and decision making solution to what has been termed ‘the regional void’ in law enforcement. The geographical structure of UK policing has always led to difficulty in the identification and assessment of regional or cross border criminal problems. The model helps by illustrating how an effective regional or cross border intelligence picture can be composed, permitting its use as the basis for joint decision-making across geographical (or indeed agency) boundaries.

The professionalisation of the business, including as it does a complete description of the process and purpose of intelligence, clarifies the requirements for intelligence training and staff selection.

The National Intelligence Model, therefore, links business planning directly with operational outcomes. It offers the long sought-after benefits of an integrated intelligence system by linking intelligence, prevention and enforcement activities at the local, regional and national levels.
Tasking and Co-ordination

1. The Tasking and Co-ordination Meeting

The national intelligence model is as much a management decision making model as a description of intelligence process and products. The critical factor in securing reduction in crime is the proactive role of management.

The point of tasking and co-ordination is to achieve maximum impact. To do this, law enforcement managers must have a good view of the real nature of the problems they face and a mechanism for decision making which identifies priorities, the resources required and which can commission action. The tasking and co-ordination process is that mechanism and the meeting is the pivot of the process.

Why have a meeting?
- To drive the control strategy setting the agenda for intelligence, prevention and enforcement priorities
- To tackle the strategic issues within the command unit area
- To tackle the tactical issues within the command unit area

Who chairs the meeting?
- At Level 1 – Typically, the manager with senior operational responsibility
- At multi-agency meetings at Levels 2 and 3 – A mutually appointed senior member

Who attends?
- Typically, the intelligence manager, analyst, middle managers with operational responsibility, relevant specialists as required

What is the format of the meeting?
- Periodically to sit as a strategic group, typically quarterly or half yearly
- More frequently to sit as the tactical group, typically weekly or fortnightly

Strategic Tasking

The purpose of the strategic tasking and co-ordination meetings is to set up or amend the control strategy and, having set the priorities, to make the principal resource commitments. This strategic meeting, therefore, does not meet frequently, rather at intervals relevant to its strategic character, say quarterly or half yearly and linked to the business planning round. It is difficult to see this meeting achieve its purpose if it meets less frequently than annually.

Its work is done on the basis of the picture of the problems and issues painted by the strategic assessment, which having been considered in the light of the governmental and local objectives, is used to determine and set the priorities for intelligence, enforcement and prevention. Its work is completed by the allocation of resources and setting of policies needed to deliver the control strategy.

Work at any of the levels of the model should not be confined to that level. Rather the strategic intelligence assessment should report on relevant intelligence requirements at the other two levels and due weight should be taken of these needs in the setting of priorities and allocation of resources. This might mean, for example, that in order to achieve success at Level 1, some local resources may need to be earmarked for meeting a Level 2 need.
This reflects the fact that strategic intelligence assessments at Levels 1 and 3 depend to a large extent for their accuracy on the contributions made by Level 1 intelligence activity.

As mentioned above, the strategic tasking and co-ordination groups will also interpret and plan to meet objectives set centrally by government. At Level 1, it will co-ordinate plans with local authorities under the terms of the Crime and Disorder Act as part of the establishment of priorities for prevention and enforcement in the control strategy. In addition, the strategic tasking and co-ordinating group will be concerned to ‘plan in’ the requirement to maintain community confidence.

To do all of this, resource requirements must be identified and a balance sought between reactive and proactive activity.

**Tactical Tasking**

The tactical tasking and co-ordination group meets on a far more frequent basis, perhaps weekly. It has three main roles: to commission and apply the tactical menu to the control strategy, to respond to new needs and to check that agreed plans and enforcement work are still on course to meet objectives. The tactical assessment is the key intelligence product that drives decision making.

The tactical menu comprises four elements:

- targeting offenders in line with the priorities of the control strategy
- the management of crime and disorder hot spots
- the investigation of crimes and incidents which can be shown to be linked into ‘series’
- the application of the range of preventative measures such as CCTV and lighting schemes or community action initiatives

In effect the checking of progress and encouraging work in the four boxes of the tactical menu is the heart of the agenda for the tactical tasking and co-ordination meeting. To be effective, this meeting must demand accountability from those charged with investigating targets, from those allocated responsibility for planning the management of hot spots, from those applying preventative initiatives and from those overseeing series crime...
investigations. This accountability to the tasking and co-ordinating group reflects that these problems, at the local level, concern the whole organisation, not merely individual departments.

The review of progress on plans, operations and investigation performance together with immediate resource needs is, therefore, a crucial part of the tactical tasking and co-ordinating group function.

The tactical assessment will help the group ensure that, alongside performance on the agreed strategy, new and emerging issues are also taken into account in a methodical way and that their relative performance can be properly judged. A further crucial role is to monitor the volume and quality of intelligence to and from operational staff and that supplied to the tasking and co-ordination group.

At Level 2 and three, tasking and co-ordination are effected by multi-agency groups, regional or national. The same requirements arise about setting priorities and overseeing the application of the tactical menu which, at the higher level, predominantly concerns targeting criminal and criminal organisations. Level 2 tasking and co-ordination is concerned to identify the regional criminal activity which can only be tackled on a collaborative basis. The provision of a regional strategic overview is only possible when force and agency intelligence products are of such a standard that they can be aggregated into the bigger picture. NCIS plays a major role in bringing the strategic overview into being in partnership with force intelligence bureaux and agency intelligence units.

The section on ‘links between the levels’ describes the process by which each level relates to each other and by which the symbiosis can be resourced and operate.

Sir David O’Dowd, CBE, QPM
Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary

"In producing the National Intelligence Model NCIS have achieved a rare balance between sophistication and ease of application. Their painstaking work has resulted in an approach that will prove transparent and resilient to the closest scrutiny of the integrity and efficiency of police operations.

The Model will prove indispensable to strategic managers and operational officers in addressing not only crime matters but the whole range of services required of the police, including traffic, public order events and major emergencies. I commend it to the service."

Key Activities of the Tasking and Co-ordinating Meeting

- Meets periodically as the Strategic Tasking and Co-ordination meeting
- Meets more frequently as the Tactical Tasking and Co-ordination meeting
- As the strategic group sets the control strategy, priorities for intelligence, prevention and enforcement, and, the primary resource allocation
- As the tactical group applies and drives the tactical menu
- Is driven by the four key intelligence products
Tasking and Co-ordination

2. Production of Intelligence Products

The intelligence model is not a model which asks for intelligence for its own sake. Its design reflects the principle that intelligence work is of no value if it does not result in intelligence products for managers and others; products which help decision making and guide investigations or deployments in the law enforcement effort. At the heart of the tasking and co-ordination process at all levels of the model are the key intelligence products. These are the ‘deliverables’ by which intelligence led policing can be implemented and its impact measured in terms of crime reduction, arrests, disruptions and enhanced community safety.

The creation of the key intelligence products is only possible if knowledge, analysis and systems are in being. The quality of the intelligence products is dependant therefore on the creation and maintenance by management of the right conditions for intelligence activity.

Intelligence products are the result of the collaboration between analysts and intelligence officers in which the raw information is collected, analysed and interpreted, and presented with recommendations about required decisions or options for action. The intelligence led approach to law enforcement requires only four key intelligence products.

Their production is dependent upon nine analytical techniques and products described later.

Key Intelligence Products

The four key intelligence products are: strategic assessments; tactical assessments; target profiles and problem profiles.

Strategic Assessments

The main purpose of the strategic assessment is to give the tasking and co-ordination group an accurate picture of the situation in its area of responsibility, how that picture is changing now and how it may change in the future. It is by definition a longer term, high level look at the law enforcement issues and it will, therefore, not only consider current activities but also try to provide a forecast of likely developments. A locally produced
strategic assessment will assist planning and policy making in the area and contribute to
the bigger picture of patterns and trends in the region and nationally. Crime and Disorder
Act audits, demographic and social changes, patterns of offending, the impact of organised
criminality are all elements of the strategic assessment. These are contrasted with the
requirements of objectives set by commanders, police authorities and the Home Office.
The strategic assessment will also note the contribution to be made to the national intelli-
gence requirement which derives from the Level 3 strategic assessment, (the UK Threat
Assessment produced by NCIS). In considering such factors in an ‘overview’, it will be
possible to see where limited resources can be deployed to greatest effect.

Tactical Assessments
The tactical assessment forms the basis for the work of the tactical tasking and co-ordina-
tion group which has as its focus the ‘four boxes’ of the tactical menu. The assessment will
be able to identify emerging patterns and trends requiring attention, including further
analysis. Progress in investigations or preventive initiatives can be addressed as can
immediate needs for changes in resourcing tactical options. If used effectively the tactical
assessment will give an early indication of deteriorating performance in, for example,
committed crime rates. Experience shows that the earliest possible indication of
deteriorating performance is required if crime reduction progress is to be sustained.
Target Profiles

A target profile is person(s) specific and contains sufficient detail to initiate a target operation or support an ongoing operation against an individual or networked group of individuals. It comprises as complete an information package as possible in the light of the available intelligence. It also shows links to other investigations (at all levels of the model) and may include risk profiles of potentially dangerous offenders such as paedophiles. On the basis of the intelligence revealed, the target profile includes an interpretation of the best course of action and proposals to fill the gaps in the intelligence picture.

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<th>Product</th>
<th>Aim</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Content</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target Profile</td>
<td>To provide a detailed picture of the (potential) offender and his associates for subsequent action.</td>
<td>To assist operational management in selecting targets, guiding investigations, shaping plans and maintaining supervision</td>
<td>Personal record</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Notes:
1. Includes habits, lifestyle, modus operandi, addresses, places frequented, family-tree chart, photographs, risk to public, ability to protect himself, and related information.
2. Includes flagging record, firearm possession/offences, core-nominal status review.
3. Numbers of all phone, pager, fax, mobile, call boxes, etc, used and techniques employed.
4. Includes compromise data and suitable observation points.

Problem Profile

A problem profile identifies established and emerging crime or incident series. It also identifies established and emerging crime and incident 'hot spots' together with the opportunities for preventative work revealed by the intelligence. In the case of crime series identification where MOs are confirmed and links to potential offenders established, the profile supports targeting and reactive investigation, as well as preventive initiatives. In the case of hot spots the identification of levels and patterns of offending offers direction for the setting and execution of hot spot management plans which may incorporate partnership in crime reduction initiatives. Hot spot profiles will also usually contain profiles of identified offenders and trouble-makers within the hot spot.

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem Profile</td>
<td>To identify established and emerging crime/ incident series and crime hot spots.</td>
<td>To assist management in resourcing investigative needs, targeting, hot spot management, and directing crime-reduction initiatives and crime-prevention measures.</td>
<td>Problem identification</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The four key intelligence products are designed to enable the tasking and co-ordination group to set effective strategy. They are designed to enable the group to commission and gauge the success of projects within the four boxes of the tactical menu in line with the priorities of the strategy, and to enable investigators and others to execute the operations which result.

**Key Aspects of the Production of Intelligence Products**

- Only four in number: strategic assessment, tactical assessment, target profiles and problem profiles
- They are the drivers of the business in the tasking and co-ordinating meeting
- They should take account of the priorities
- They are designed to enable the tasking and co-ordinating meeting to commission work – operations or projects - within the four options of the tactical menu
- They provide information to the meeting on the progress of commissioned work
Tasking and Co-ordination

3. Prioritised Intelligence Work – setting up and running intelligence units

The intelligence model shows the prioritisation of intelligence work as one of the three key elements in the tasking and co-ordination process. ‘Prioritisation of intelligence work’ has two facets. First, the strategic tasking and co-ordination group works from a single key intelligence product, the strategic assessment, on the basis of which it sets the ‘control strategy’, an integral part of which is the setting of operational intelligence priorities, or an ‘intelligence requirement’. This directs the work of intelligence staff in the provision of intelligence to operational teams as well as continuing to provide strategic intelligence. Equally, the collection of intelligence by Patrol officers, and others acting in a reactive role can be aligned with the identified priorities in the control strategy.

Second, managers need to ensure that the intelligence structure itself is properly resourced, properly set up and is doing the right things. The creation of intelligence products is best achieved through the use of dedicated intelligence units.

An effective, secure, intelligence unit needs four main assets: it needs adequate sources of information, appropriately organised people, and access to the range of ‘knowledge products’ and ‘system products’. The knowledge products and system products can be either local or national in nature and are described later in this book.

Sources
The sources which intelligence staff need to access are wide ranging including victims, witnesses, prisoners, informants and surveillance product. A soundly equipped intelligence regime will be able to access a wide range of existing data as well as undertake proactive source recruitment and deployments to fill identified intelligence gaps.

People
The second asset required is people. There are a variety of functions to be performed in the delivery of effective intelligence whether or not dedicated units are created. Where availability of resources dictates, some of the functions may be combined.
It is vital that an intelligence manager of appropriate status be appointed to ensure that meaning and significance are added to the analytical techniques and products before they are presented, as completed intelligence products, to the tasking and co-ordination group. It is equally important that intelligence as a discipline be adequately represented in management discussions about resources. The role of the intelligence manager is not only about the administration of the intelligence collection and analysis but also to bring together analysis, intelligence and the managers of the command unit. In particular, the intelligence manager must ensure the feasibility of the choices under the tactical menu are clear to the tasking and co-ordination group.

It is important that intelligence units be equipped not just to handle information that is already known, or is acquired in reactive investigation, but also to gather information through proactive or covert means. Gaps in intelligence will often be identified that cannot be filled by analysis and collation of existing material. Intelligence units must have the skills and capability to handle live sources, as well as opportunities for technical surveillance operations. There is a need therefore for field capability and for team supervision of field work and the handling of informants and confidential sources.

The data management function needs to ensure that incoming information is assessed for accuracy, reliability and value to the ‘control strategy’ or current operations. At this stage some initial assessment of risks attaching to the use of the intelligence may be required and there will be a need to differentiate between that intelligence which requires fast-time dissemination and that which requires development. There is a requirement to provide search and query facilities. Review and weeding processes need to be established and a comprehensive file tracking system for approved intelligence developments and collection plans is highly desirable. Team supervision in the ‘desk’ functions will therefore also be required.

Briefing responsibilities arising from the model are extensive. Opportunities arise for directed patrols and requirements arise too for quality briefings for management and operational teams in both urgent and pre-planned situations.

Trained analysts are required if the standards inherent in the model are to be reached. The analytical techniques and products are part of a standard range which underpins the national vocational training arrangements for law enforcement analysts.
There is great value, too, in close links between intelligence units and tactical crime reduction specialists who can react in fast time to apply preventive measures where required.

**The Functionality of an Intelligence Unit**

With the right people in place, the model gives guidance on the general functionality of an intelligence unit.

The prime function of the intelligence unit is the collection and reception of data, against the background of the priorities set by the *tasking and co-ordination* group in the *control strategy*. The unit will only deliver the intelligence products that lead to the greatest impact if its work is kept on course, and strong management is required to prevent its wandering, and collecting intelligence on issues of secondary importance. The law enforcement environment is, however, a fast moving one in which matters requiring urgent attention are frequently likely to come to notice. Whilst it remains essential that the sense of direction be maintained, a fast track procedure for actioning urgent intelligence is necessary.

The Data Management function inputs data and provides access to the data for those who are authorised. It also offers research capability to support the work of analysts. Analysts themselves need dedicated time in order to produce quality products; they should not be side-tracked into performing basic data management tasks.

In the intelligence development function the unit requires capability in proactive field intelligence for the recruitment and deployment of live sources, as well as access to covert technical resources.

Collectively, the components of this process provide the intelligence products for both *tasking and co-ordination* and operational support.
Key Points in the Prioritising of Intelligence Work

- Sources of information should not be limited to either reactive or proactive work. Much valuable data exists in the result of existing reactive work. A sufficient proactive capability is also essential.

- An investment in the right people with specific roles is a significant benefit

- Three major components of work exist: data management, analysis and specific intelligence collection

- The Intelligence Manager is the essential catalyst for bringing the business of the command unit, the intelligence collection and analysis together

- All intelligence work should be supported by the Knowledge Products and System Products
Knowledge Products

The intelligence model provides as complete a description of requirements as possible. It deals with the production and presentation of intelligence for strategic and tactical use, it gives guidance on how to organise resources dedicated to intelligence functions to best effect, and it gives advice to management about the tasking and co-ordination of law enforcement activity based on the intelligence products. An equally vital component is the professional knowledge of the staff who contribute to or use the intelligence process. Indeed without that the rest is destined to be only partially effective.

The model asserts that the intelligence discipline has to be learned. Staff need access to the ‘knowledge products’ which provide quality assurance to the model. They are a range of products, either national or local, which define the rules for the conduct of the business or the best practice by which skilled processes are completed, and under what conditions work between agencies may take place.

There is something in this excellent model for everyone in law enforcement. Its use can only benefit the attack on all types of crime. The National Crime Squad will give priority to implementation of those principles and products which will enhance our response to national and transnational organised crime.

Roy Penrose, OBE, QPM
Director General, National Crime Squad

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In other words, they contribute to the corpus of professional knowledge in identifying how components within the model operate and their provision needs to be an integral part of a separate and distinct intelligence strategy if the National Intelligence Model is to become a dynamic within the organisation.

The strategy needs, of course, to be written in clear and simple language in order for everyone to understand what the required intelligence outcomes are, how they are to be achieved, why they are necessary, where individuals fit in, and what they should contribute. Controlled access to ‘knowledge products’ is vital if staff are to achieve the performance potential of the model.

Access to the ‘knowledge products’ makes staff fit for their roles. The knowledge required will vary according to both the role of the individual and the level of criminality which is being tackled. So the term ‘knowledge products’ describes a variety of local, regional or national rules and information which an organisation’s intelligence strategy may need to embrace. Some are common. For example, all police forces will need to take into account when training staff:
current legislation
the ACPO Crime Committee Intelligence Strategy
the force’s own intelligence and Crime and Disorder Act strategies
the methodology of the national intelligence model
the national codes of practice for covert law enforcement techniques and related manuals of ‘tradecraft’ standards and similar issues
the role of the national working groups on standards in covert techniques
the rules for access to and use of national systems such as Phoenix and NAFIS, the national informant registration database
local protocols governing exchanges of information and joint working with other agencies
current national training requirements, for example for informant handlers and for analysts
the corpus of case-law knowledge which the National Crime Faculty maintains as a support for the national training effort

As the level of complexity in operations increases, staff require additional knowledge. Those operating regionally or against organised crime require a wider understanding of the national and international dimensions of law enforcement, the range of technical and specialist help which is available to investigators, and on what terms. At this level staff need to be familiar with, for example:

the service level agreements between the agencies which spell out the requirements for joint working and the delivery of support and service functions
the role and capability of the security and intelligence agencies in organised crime intelligence and the means by which they may be accessed
the functioning of international access and liaison arrangements – Europol, the liaison officer networks of NCIS and HM Customs and Excise, for example
the means by which expert guidance may be obtained on technical support for higher level investigations

The model’s description of ‘knowledge products’ is also intended to help in the definition of required skills and competencies for intelligence staff and those whose work is derived from or contributes to the intelligence process. The required skills and competencies for analysts have been set on a national basis. The national manuals contain advice on skill profiles and competencies for informant handlers. In considering the required range of ‘knowledge products’ it becomes clearer what attributes and standards may be required from staff. The ‘knowledge products’ approach is a useful way to manage gap analysis in moving personnel issues forward to a more professionally based intelligence regime for law enforcement.

The provision of effective intelligence in law enforcement requires the removal of barriers between forces, agencies and individuals so as to encourage the secure transmission of intelligence to where it can do most good. The starting point is to ensure that the people involved in the process share a common knowledge base.
System Products

The ‘system products’ which, along with the ‘knowledge products’, underpin the intelligence model are the enablers of intelligence led policing. They are the provision of, or access arrangements to, the systems and facilities necessary for the secure collection, recording, reception, storage, linkage, analysis and use of information.

Broadly there are three types of ‘system products’:

- provision of access to means for data storage, retrieval and comparison during the research process
- provision of access to facilities or systems for acquisition of new information and intelligence
- provision of operational security systems

Of course, in practice there is some overlap between the capability of different systems and facilities but it will be helpful to look at each in turn.

Data Systems

Access to the large quantities of readily available law enforcement and other relevant data is the backbone of intelligence led policing.

There are a number of large national information systems of immediate relevance to intelligence officers and analysts:

- Police National Computer
- NAFIS
- Interpol, Europol and, in the future, Sirene
- the NCIS (Alert) database
- specific law enforcement agency systems, perhaps subject to controlled access, such as the CEDRIC system of HM Customs and Excise
- the developing Police National Information Pilot
Taken together with the more local and specialised systems outlined below, these systems provide enormous potential for sophisticated analysis of criminal and other problems. The key to success, in terms of the quality of the analysed intelligence products, is the ability to access and bring together the data from disparate IS platforms. The aim is simple – to bring the widest relevant range of information sources together to help identify and describe accurately the real problems facing law enforcement as the first step to finding the solutions. The problems, to use the model’s terminology, may be ‘hotspots’, ‘crime and incident series’ or the damage done by ‘prolific offenders’.

In addition to those data access facilities already described, at the local level people require IT systems and systems controls in order to access efficiently:

- local and force case files, crime and intelligence records, operational information and incident response records, scenes of crime records
- ‘open source’ information
- in order to manage properly the work of the intelligence unit itself an intelligence file tracking system is required which registers and monitors progress on agreed intelligence development work

Good law enforcement has always relied upon the identification of problems by local officers alert to local issues and responsive to community concerns. However, as criminality seems to become ever more sophisticated and mobile, the identification of patterns is beyond the capability of localised, informal methods of identification. The national intelligence model complements the intuitive local approach and gives advice on the requirements for accessing and analysing available data. It thereby spreads the principle, that of ‘knowing the real nature of the business’, from the local to the regional and international levels.

**Intelligence Acquisition**

The gathering of intelligence to fill identified needs may require the deployment of ‘human sources’, such as informants or undercover officers, or the deployment of human or technical surveillance resources. At the higher level of operations there will be a requirement to access sophisticated covert entry techniques or intercept communications. Intelligence Units at each of the levels in the model require access to these proactive resources to an extent which is appropriate to their business. The more intrusive techniques are only available in serious crime cases and the requirement to protect the secrecy of methodologies makes it undesirable that they be used where they cannot be deployed securely. Mobile surveillance resources are generally expensive and require a sound intelligence case to be made for their deployment.

At the local level intelligence units will require possession of technical surveillance facilities commensurate with the investigations pursued at that level, and clear systems in place through which more sophisticated facilities can be accessed when the need arises. Within police forces the distribution of surveillance resources, and the systems for accessing the more expensive or sensitive, will be policy issues integral to the crime and intelligence strategies.

An intelligence unit needs an appropriately secure environment in which to exploit its access to surveillance and proactive intelligence collection facilities.
Operational Security and Effectiveness

Intelligence is a valuable commodity and must consequently be handled with care. The need to know principle is widely recognised as the backbone of the intelligence doctrine.

“‘Need to know’ is a security principle that the dissemination of classified information should be no wider than is required for the efficient conduct of the business in hand and restricted to those who have authorised access.”

The correct balance to be struck between making information as widely available as possible to maximise its potential benefit, and restricting its availability to protect the security of sources, techniques and information is critical. A number of access systems and facilities help support the integrity and effectiveness of the intelligence environment:

- the informant registration system
- the provision and use of analytical tools of the right standard
- the provision of secure accommodation and secure storage facilities
- the provision of appropriate briefing facilities, suitably secure when necessary
- the adoption of the national standard intelligence recording form which incorporates risk assessments and handling restrictions
- controlled access to foreign law enforcement agencies

The ‘system products’ description in the intelligence model assists in the gap analysis of facilities necessary when setting up or reviewing intelligence structures. The ‘system products’ complement the ‘knowledge products’ as the fundamental enablers of sound law enforcement intelligence work.
The Analytical Techniques and Products

Results Analysis

Results analysis is a new discipline which evaluates the effectiveness of law enforcement activities, for example the effectiveness of patrol strategies, crime reduction initiatives or a particular method of investigation. The technique may assist in identifying best practice and highlighting areas for improvement. In major investigations it may contribute by providing a structured debriefing process. Results analysis can also be a valuable tool for monitoring the progress of plans. Graphs, charts and maps may all be used in presenting results analysis which may contribute to all four key intelligence products.

Example – results analysis

The identification of a crime and disorder hot spot resulted in a range of inter-agency measures in a hot spot management plan: controls on licensed premises; installation of better lighting; a proactive crime prevention advice and help campaign; installation of CCTV; directed patrols; targeting known offenders and extension of neighbourhood watch. As the plan was executed, results analysis was conducted to establish the nature of the changes in offending patterns brought about, whether displacement had occurred, which measures appeared to have greatest impact, the level of community satisfaction and support for police action. The results analysis fed into the problem profile and the tactical assessment which enabled the tasking and co-ordination group to measure effectiveness and replicate successful measures in other areas.

David Veness, QPM
Assistant Commissioner (Specialist Operations)
Metropolitan Police Service

“The Metropolitan Police Service is happy to commend the National Intelligence Model and have already taken steps to implement its proposals. We will be realigning our business wherever necessary to complement its principles.”

David Veness, QPM
Assistant Commissioner (Specialist Operations)
Metropolitan Police Service
Crime Pattern Analysis

Crime pattern analysis is a generic term for a number of related analytical disciplines such as crime, or incident series identification, crime trend analysis, hot spot analysis and general profile analysis. Above all, crime pattern analysis looks for linkages between crimes and other forms of offending to reveal similarities and differences. It can help to reveal the relationships between crimes and offer opportunities to link committed offences quickly to possible offenders. It identifies where prevention and diversion initiatives will be most effective and reveals new and emerging trends for subsequent analysis. It is a major component of problem profiles and contributes to both strategic and tactical assessments.

Example – crime pattern analysis

An analyst tracked the commission of burglaries in business premises in a BCU. Initially they did not appear connected but a pattern began to emerge which showed the chips in computers of a particular make were always targeted, even though other property was also stolen. Similarities in methods of entry also became evident. Analysis of crime records, incident records and intelligence logs submitted by patrols revealed sightings of a similar vehicle on a number of occasions. The analyst widened the search for data to neighbouring BCUs and a clear pattern of offences began to emerge. Further analysis of the MOs and profiles of known offenders, their vehicles and associates offered suspects for investigation. The analyst was also able to provide information of use in predicting possible future targets and routes used by the offenders, as well as revealing weaknesses in security of buildings and the design of the machines which assisted the criminals. A comprehensive package of CPA supported reactive investigation, proactive targeting of suspects, the briefing and deployment of patrols, the identification of ‘target hardening’ and other preventive opportunities as well as advice to the manufacturers.
Market Profiles
A market profile is an assessment, continually reviewed and updated, that surveys the criminal market around a particular commodity, such as drugs or stolen vehicles, or of a service, such as prostitution, in an area. It will detail how active the market is, the trends in availability and price of the commodities or services, the key individuals, networks, criminal assets and associated trends in related criminality which are driven by or connected to the criminal market. The production and maintenance of market profiles demands an investment of resources which requires it to be focused on problems which have been given a priority by the tasking and co-ordination group in setting its strategy. The profiles, when maintained on a local or BCU basis can be aggregated into a force or regional overview of the problem and, by revealing where activities overlap, are an aid to higher level target selection. The profile incorporates a number of established analytical disciplines and may lead into a requirement for other analytical techniques and intelligence products – target profiling for example.

Example – market profile
In responding to the problems caused by the use of heroin, a BCU undertook collation and analysis of information about known local dealers and their networks. A number of networks were shown to be interconnected with a small number of individuals influential in supply, the provision of premises or transport, providing security, running couriers and laundering proceeds. The profile also showed the connection between the heroin suppliers and the patterns of burglary and street robbery in the area. The information provided contributed significantly to the enforcement side of the local drugs strategy. The local targeting regime followed the priorities revealed by the analysis and opportunities arose for hot spot management and preventive initiatives. Neighbouring BCU’s adopted the same market profiling technique and it quickly became clear that a smaller number of individuals were connected to networks which operated across the whole force. These people were targeted by force level investigators giving the force drugs strategy an integrated enforcement component.
Demographic/Social Trend Analysis

This type of analysis is centred on an examination of the nature of demographic changes and their impact on criminality, as well as on the deeper analysis of social factors such as unemployment and homelessness which might underlie changes or trends in offenders or offending behaviour. It therefore considers the significance of population shifts, attitudes and activities. The analysis could form the basis of Crime and Disorder Act audits that help meet local planning requirements; as such it is reliant upon the ability to access data held outside law enforcement circles. When the data is aggregated it is a valuable input to local and national policies. The technique is useful in fostering more effective community partnerships by predicting where future pressures are likely to arise. It can also have a short term impact by identifying the need to respond to temporary movements of people into an area.

Example – demographic and social trend analysis

A seaside town experienced a substantial seasonal rise in crime of all types, particularly burglary, every summer commencing in the second week of June. The summer generally sees an influx of visitors and usually an increase in arrests for possession of heroin. The analyst was given the job of explaining the nature of the problem as a prelude to proposals for action. Analysis of arrests and intelligence reports showed that a disproportionate number of those coming to notice were young unemployed people from the nearest large city. Analysis of their lifestyles and means of support suggested they were attracted for the summer by the wide availability of cheap bed and breakfast accommodation for benefit claimants and by the availability of heroin. A large proportion of the increase in criminality and disorder occurred in and around the main area of town where such accommodation is located and was connected with drugs. The analysis provided focus for the police response to a seasonal population increase and suggested options for patrol, inter-agency and crime prevention initiatives as well as a focus for diversion activity within the local drugs strategy. It provided, too, focus for the intelligence requirement in respect of the rise in crime and drugs problems.
Criminal Business Profiles

These profiles contain detailed analysis of how criminal operations or techniques work, in the same way that legitimate businesses may be explained. The profile therefore examines all aspects of the criminals’ MO, including how victims are selected, the technical processes involved in the crimes, methods of removing, disposing of or laundering proceeds, and weaknesses in systems or procedures that the criminal business exploits. The profiles naturally incorporate the findings of other types of analysis such as network analysis and crime pattern analysis and can be produced at all levels of the model. The analysis can be used to identify key points for disruption, to predict criminal activities, to highlight crime prevention and reduction opportunities and facilitate operational training in effective investigative and preventive techniques. It may also shed light on the way certain criminal businesses are developing and evolving, which may be important at the higher level in helping to identify weaknesses in, or requirements for new legislation, or areas where law enforcement capability is weak, for example.

Example – criminal business profiles

The counterfeiting of credit cards is a major problem in many parts of the country. To determine how important a problem it is, and therefore the level of resources to be committed in order to tackle, it requires the drawing up of a criminal business profile. This profile details how the perpetrators obtain the raw materials, produce and distribute the counterfeit cards, the type of equipment used to produce them, the way that the money is moved, the links between criminal groups, any front or legitimate companies involved and the steps being taken by the banks and card companies to mitigate the problem. The profile informs the setting of priorities, by assessing the damage done by the criminal business, its complexity and resilience, and also supports the tactical options by providing detailed guidance to investigators and pointing out the preventive options.
Network Analysis

Network Analysis describes not just the linkages between people who form criminal networks, but also the significance of the links, the roles played by individuals and the strengths and weaknesses of a criminal organisation. Network analysis needs therefore to examine the key attributes and functions of individuals within the network together with financial and communications arrangements. This type of analysis closely complements target profiling. At the strategic level, network analysis provides a detailed understanding of the scale and seriousness of the threat posed by criminal groups, enabling the appropriate priority to be attached to dealing with them. At the tactical level it will distinguish the most important networks to tackle as well as how best to go about undermining them. The analyst’s assessment of the continuing resilience of the network will be an important consideration in measuring the success of the law enforcement attack.

Example – network analysis

A known organised crime figure associated with armed robbery moved into an area. Contacts were observed with known local criminals and other unknown associates of the suspect. Intelligence was received that a robbery was planned but neither the victim nor the exact make up of the robbery team was known. Link charting and communications analysis carried out on the suspect and the known figures suggested lines for immediate research into criminal histories and intelligence records. Activity flow charting on previous investigations involving the suspect suggested that he would probably carry out the robbery within six weeks. As a result of this focus, targeted deployment of human and technical sources together with surveillance was possible. The ongoing network analysis provided a clear picture which supported other emerging intelligence about the probable gang members and potential victim. It also gave the investigators a clear summary of the available intelligence and a view of all their options and requirements to develop the intelligence further.
Risk Analysis
Risk Analysis is a relatively new analytical intelligence discipline. Amongst the factors that have led to its emergence are growing awareness, as a result of case law, of the concept of duty of care in law enforcement, the requirement to manage persistently dangerous offenders and the implications of the enactment of the Human Rights Act, incorporating the European Convention of Human Rights into UK law. Risk Analysis therefore assesses the scale of risks posed by individual offenders or organisations to individual potential victims, the public at large, and also to law enforcement agencies.

It aims to provide reassurance that risks involving apparently isolated incidents are being correctly assessed. It is important for law enforcement agencies to know if apparently isolated incidents are in fact part of a larger pattern or trend to which growing or greater risks attach. It will be a consideration in deciding on the priorities in dealing with individual criminals or criminal organisations and will have impact at both the strategic and tactical levels. Tactically it will be of value in helping to judge the likely consequences of law enforcement’s impact, by predicting for example the likely nature of struggles for supremacy in the drugs trade if a dominant supplier is removed.

Example – risk analysis
On the release of a sex offender from prison, local police began a risk assessment which relied upon data supplied on an inter-agency basis facilitated through a community safety case conference. The current information was supplemented with an analysis of previous patterns of offending, the nature of his association with other sex offenders and information about likely community reaction including that of relatives of previous victims. As a result the risk was assessed as high; he was subject to surveillance on release and arrested attempting to commit further offences within a few days.
Target Profile Analysis

Target profile analysis embraces a range of analytical techniques which aim to describe the criminal, his criminal activity, lifestyle, associations, the risk he poses, his strengths and weaknesses in order to give focus to the investigation targeting him. As with all analytical techniques, the profile will also enable the analyst to indicate where the gaps in knowledge exist. This enables the intelligence requirement to be identified and sources, human and technical to be deployed to meet the requirement. In some cases the profile analysis will require access to a very wide range of source data including publicly available records, police and law enforcement records, information from public authorities and utilities, information from commercial organisations, from open sources and informants in order to provide the fullest possible picture. The analysis will include appropriately detailed relevant information about associates and lifestyle. The profile should also reveal techniques which have worked against the target in the past and an assessment of the target’s capability in protecting himself from investigation and countering covert techniques.
Operational Intelligence Assessment
The purpose of this form of evaluation of incoming intelligence is to maintain the focus of an operation on the previously agreed objectives, particularly in the case of a sizeable intelligence collection plan or other large scale operation. A plan initially directed against a particular group or individual will invariably lead to other groups and individuals which, in turn, have further connections. As a result the original plan risks being diverted to pursuing leads and linkages which do not follow the set objective. The operational intelligence assessment tries to provide real time evaluation of, and research into, all incoming data connected with an operation, together with an analysis of other events and discoveries connected with the targets. The result should continually be compared with the objectives of the original collection plan. This will help identify gaps in and priorities for the operation’s intelligence effort and ensure the continuing alignment of the work.
Links between the Levels

The point has already been made that the model works either as a stand alone system for one level of activity or, preferably, as an integrated model seeking for each level to interact with the others for maximum identification of the problems and their potential solutions.

The section on prioritised intelligence work has described the structure and operation of an individual intelligence unit within a level. This section aims to describe a method of interaction between the work of intelligence units both within a level and between levels.

Level 1 Unit to Level 1 Unit

The model describes each intelligence unit within a level setting its own local intelligence requirement (its priorities for intelligence, prevention and enforcement). The first, perhaps obvious, point is that if all these intelligence units are within one organisation as each basic command unit of a police force are, the aggregation of the strategic assessments will provide a sound picture of the issues confronting the whole force. On issues requiring a further examination, a similar aggregation of the tactical assessments will provide a very detailed picture of what is occurring.

Not all crime is committed by individuals living within the same command unit area as the location of the crime. Whilst clearly the majority do, thereby justifying the investment in the creation and management of local intelligence units, the remaining offenders must be susceptible to an intelligence-led response. The standardisation of intelligence products will provide the best basis for providing such intelligence but it must be coupled with systems of access that enable each intelligence unit to benefit from the data held by its colleagues. This cannot be merely confined to access by neighbouring intelligence units but must be steered by the criminal business analysis which shows where the priority links ought to be. Systems of security and audit must be maintained in order to preserve the integrity of the data.
The second activity required is the identification of problems which can only be recognised when a higher overview is taken of the data. This requires activity by a Level 2 unit which in most police forces are called the Force Intelligence Bureau (FIB). The FIB should have access to each Level 1 strategic assessment and the other three key intelligence products to see where problems, insufficiently frequent in one basic command unit area to be identified, have through their spread over a range of locations become an issue that a force must tackle.

This will be an important role of the analytical staff in the FIB. Resources to tackle the problem, may be provided either from Level 1 command units or may, if problems are perennial, be provided from central resources. Tasking and co-ordinating groups at Level 2 within an organisation, such as a police force, will need to tackle both force level issues and cross command unit issues. Membership of the group will be arranged accordingly.

**Between Level 2 Units**

As common problems may be identified by a higher level examination of local data, so common problems may be identified and tackled by a similar process between force intelligence bureaux.

The production of strategic assessments at a force level by each FIB, drawing data from their own activities and local products, will enable the creation of regional strategic overviews. This is a role for NCIS regional offices drawing on this data. It should be observed that the regional overviews may not be contiguous with geographic regions of organisation but should be set by what is known about the nature of the problem under analysis. Criminal Business Analysis will indicate what structure such overviews should have.

Participation in the Level 2 Tasking and Co-ordinating meeting would be on a force representation basis. The senior operational manager supported by the force intelligence manager would typically attend. NCIS analytical staff and Regional Intelligence Officers should be setting the agenda for such meetings following full consultation and liaison with each of the participants.
Level 3 Activity

The pivotal product at this level is the UK Threat Assessment, more precisely titled ‘The Threat to the United Kingdom from Serious and Organised Crime’. Published annually, this document is the strategic assessment at Level 3. It is produced by NCIS drawing on data provided by Police Forces, HM Customs and Excise, the Intelligence and Security Agencies and other Law Enforcement bodies. The staple data from which this Threat Assessment is created is:

- Agency Strategic Assessments
- Police Force Strategic Assessments
- Regional Police Strategic Assessments (where available)
- Results derived from Level 3 operations
- International Strategic Assessments
- Open Source (public or semi-public data)

The UK Threat Assessment includes recommendations for the national priorities for intelligence collection, preventative action and enforcement action to the Organised Crime Strategy Group. The Organised Crime Strategy Group is chaired at a senior level by Home Office and comprises representatives of all the Intelligence, Security and Law Enforcement Agencies. This group considers the data and recommendations with the Threat Assessment and prescribes the priorities for the ensuing year. The group also sets the control strategy for impacting these priorities to link together the work of the Executive, Administration, Law Enforcement and Intelligence and Security Agencies.
A Case Study – extending the boundaries: applying the intelligence model to an international problem

The stolen car market is vast. The theft of vehicles is a major concern for law enforcement agencies at local, regional and international levels. Many thousands of vehicles each year are broken for spares or given new identities and re-sold on the legitimate market, often, in the case of high value vehicles, through export to other countries.

How criminals turn a profit internationally in the stolen vehicle business depends, as it does at the local level, upon their access to technical skills and their knowledge of the legitimate vehicle trade, in this case in their target countries. In other words, they have to understand the business and be able to play in the market. In vehicle crime there is a complex relationship between the availability of marketable vehicles, the demand for them, the buoyancy of the legitimate trade, the rigour of registration and control systems, and insurance procedures.

Together with law enforcement partners the organised vehicle crime section of NCIS routinely researches the international trafficking of stolen vehicles. The growth of the business is the result of its increasing profitability and the relatively uncoordinated law enforcement response which reduces the chances of detection. For example, when a vehicle is stolen a police report is almost invariably generated. Typically, police reports on stolen vehicles are circulated on a national basis but information about vehicles reported stolen abroad has usually not been immediately available to investigators. There are few checks on the international transit of vehicles travelling under their own power. Equally, international organised crime is well versed in the movement of goods by container. In other words, it has been easier for the criminals to exploit the market than it has been for the law enforcement agencies to control it.

Just as UK investigators have gained insights into the extent of the stolen vehicle business and the critical factors which enable it to thrive, so investigators in other jurisdictions have seen similar challenges arise and have tried to come together to pool knowledge and look for better ways of joint working to tackle the problem. They have similar experiences and their analyses of the local and regional features of the international traffic in stolen cars are also very similar: high value vehicles vanishing from streets and garages; the involvement of apparently legitimate car breakers and dealers; the clever exploitation of weaknesses and loopholes in registration procedures.

In 1998 the Belgian and Dutch authorities co-operated in an operation targeting the export of stolen vehicles through the deep-water ports. The exercise added significantly to European expertise in profiling. Increasingly, the recognition has grown that in order to thwart the trade, a European-wide response is required.

The questions which are now being asked are: what does the big picture of European vehicle crime look like; how exactly do the criminal businesses operate, and on what basis do we work together?

Last year NCIS sought to take the lead in co-ordinating efforts throughout Europe and organised, in Birmingham, a conference of European vehicle crime investigators to discuss the way forward. It was agreed that the response would be based on the precepts of the intelligence model.

The investigators set up a tasking and co-ordination group which will, in the first instance, establish the intelligence requirement and oversee the international effort to meet it, the effort to ‘paint the big picture’ of who the main players are, how the markets and the criminal businesses operate, and on what basis do we work together?

The principles of the model have been adopted because the international investigators believe they provide a sound structure for managing this difficult law enforcement problem. They need to see the big picture, they need to know how the markets and the criminals work and they need to keep each other informed and tactically effective. The model’s framework meets their needs.
Advice relating to the National Intelligence Model is available Monday to Friday (9.00am to 5.00pm) – from the NCIS Corporate Development Branch  
(tel: +44 (0)20 7238 8095)

Publications available from NCIS Corporate Communications  
(tel: +44 (0)20 7238 8431)  
include:

NCIS Annual Report; *Nexus*, the NCIS Criminal Intelligence magazine; press releases and briefing notes on recent issues and events involving NCIS. All information on NCIS is available on the regularly updated website  
http://www.ncis.co.uk

Law enforcement enquiries should be made initially through the main switchboard  
(tel: +44 (0)20 7238 8000)

Media enquiries should be made through Corporate Communications  
(tel: +44 (0)20 7238 8431)  
email: press@spring9.demon.co.uk

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