

HEDDLU DYFED-POWYS POLICE



Intelligence

Best Value Review

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REVIEW HEAD

DETECTIVE INSPECTOR IAN GRIFFITHS

POLICE AUTHORITY SCRUTINY



Best Value

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Gwerth Gorau



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Notes

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Glossary

ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
ANPR	Automatic Number Plate Recognition (system).
BCS	British Crime Survey
BCU	Basic Command Unit (formerly known as Divisions)
Bronze Target	Criminals who require heightened local awareness, whose arrest can be achieved through normal policing methods with the minimum of resources (q.v. Silver and Gold). Referred to in the National Intelligence Model as a Level 1 target.
BV	Best Value
BVPI	Best Value Performance Indicator
BVRT	Best Value Review Team. In Dyfed-Powys , a joint Police Authority and Police team reviewing a particular police function to meet statutory requirements under the Local Government Act 1999
C2	Headquarters based CID Unit focussing effort on cross-border criminals.
CCTV	Closed Circuit Television.
CHIS	Covert Human Intelligence Source. A registered informant, sometimes but not always in receipt of payment for their information, and 'handled' by a specified officer.
CID	Criminal Investigation Department.
CDRP	Crime & Disorder Reduction Partnerships. Statute based joint working group involving Police with other public sector service providers.
CMRD	Crime Management and Reduction Department. A unified management structure encompassing the, previously separate, CID and Community Safety functions.
COR	Covert Operations Registry. A function within the Force Intelligence Bureau overseeing the deployment if covert human and technical resources across the Force.
CPA	Crime Pattern Analysis. A method for linking crime series and trends to identify hotspots, similarities and differences.
CSO	Crime Support Officer (also an abbreviation for Community Safety Officer or Community Support Officer)
Det. Supt.	Detective Superintendent
DCS	Detective Chief Superintendent
DC	Detective Constable
DS	Detective Sergeant
DI	Detective Inspector
DNA	<p>DNA (Deoxyribonucleic acid) is a chemical structure that forms chromosomes. Chromosomes are rod-like structures of tightly coiled DNA found in the cell nucleus of plants and animals. Chromosomes are normally found in pairs; human beings typically have 23 pairs of chromosomes in every cell. There are so many millions of base pairs in each person's DNA that every person has a different sequence.</p> <p>Using these sequences, every person could be identified solely by the sequence of their base pairs. However, because there are so many millions of base pairs, the task would be very time-consuming. Instead, scientists are able to use a shorter method, because of repeating patterns in DNA.</p> <p>These patterns do not, however, give an individual "fingerprint," but they are able to determine whether two DNA samples are from the same person, related people, or non-related people. Scientists use a small number of sequences of DNA that are known to vary among individuals a great deal, and analyse those to get a certain probability of a match.</p>

DPP	Dyfed – Powys Police
EFQM	European Foundation for Quality Management. An organisation dedicated to improving organisational management and providing appropriate accreditation.
FIB	Force Intelligence Bureau
FIO	Field Intelligence Officer
Gold Target	Criminals whose offending takes place across the force area or interforce boundaries and are involved in serious, series and volume crime and the trafficking of drugs. The level of criminality requires the deployment of specialist and centralized resources in support of a co-ordinated strategy. Individuals whose protocols dictate that outside agencies must have involvement or primacy will be nominated as Gold Targets (q.v. Bronze and Silver). Referred to in the National Intelligence Model as a Level 2 target.
HMCE	Her Majesty's Customs & Excise
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary. One of two organisations overseeing implementation of Best Value (the other is the Audit Commission). Also, responsible in general terms for assessing Force and BCU activity.
HMP	Her Majesty's Prison (Service)
HQ	Headquarters
LCS	Local Crime System
NCS	National Crime Squad
NCIS	National Criminal Intelligence Service
NIM	National Intelligence Model; A process or business framework to drive effective law enforcement strategy. The basic thrust is grounded in intelligence led policing.
PNC	Police National Computer
POP	Problem Orientated Policing. A concept suggesting that, instead of simply responding to incidents, policing should at heart be about solving underlying problems within the community, and crime prevention activity needs to be prioritised in order to maximise results.
Pro-active Team	A BCU based pool of officers that can be tasked to deal with particular crime problems. Occasionally they can also be used to augment C2 (qv) operations.
RIPA	Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (2000). The legal framework, and Codes of Practice, that govern the employment of informants (CHIS) for police purposes.
RISG	Regional Intelligence Sub-Group. A tasking and co-ordination committee with representatives from several forces, generally examining higher-level intelligence targets.
SCAS	The Serious Crime Analysis Section (SCAS) carries out analytical work on behalf of the forces. Its national remit comes from ACPO and its Scottish counterpart ACPOS. It conducts comparative case analysis (CCA) on rape, murder and abduction cases, subject to specific criteria. It is part of Centrex.
Silver Target	Criminals whose offending takes place on a divisional basis and who have reached a level of criminality that requires the deployment of specific divisional resources supported by a co-coordinated strategy (q.v. Bronze and Gold). Referred to in the National Intelligence Model as a Level 1 target.

Police Authority Foreword

The Government's reform agenda for the Police Service includes a significant emphasis on the nature and role of intelligence. The way in which intelligence is handled can have a significant impact on the actual performance of the Force and, because of this, is an area the Police Authority are actively interested in.

The National Intelligence Model (NIM) is the system through which all police forces will manage their intelligence. It is a way to organise police resources, to increase efficiency, effectiveness and economy, and to direct them clearly towards the priorities of the community of Dyfed-Powys.

These priorities, better informed by the involvement of our Crime and Disorder Act Partners at strategic levels, will ensure that Dyfed-Powys Police continues to service the needs of the community in a manner that is transparent and fully accountable.

This review underlines that the Force is already well advanced in its implementation of the NIM. Indeed, it is to the credit of the Force that development of the intelligence process has continued throughout the course of this review and that several emerging recommendations have already seen implementation. The remaining recommendations of the review will further assist to fine tune the capabilities of our intelligence staff and the support they provide to front-line policing.

Mr Keith Reeves
Clerk to the Authority

Notes

Introduction

1. Traditionally, public, political and police attention has been focused on police action much more than it has focused on police information or intelligence activities. This is, at least in part, because the 'action' and 'excitement' of patrol and public order functions generate more attention than activities such as information gathering and analysis.
2. This focus, however, has been changing for a number of reasons. Primarily, the rise in transnational organised crime has demanded the creation of new police strategies. Generally these strategies have to develop in an environment where state budgets are declining and improved co-ordination between different policing sectors is a requirement.
3. There have been a variety of reviews and reports that have looking at the role of intelligence in relation to policing in the United Kingdom. The Baumber report¹ highlighted a requirement to co-ordinate information about serious, organised and cross-border crime. The Pearce report² led to the establishment of Regional Criminal Intelligence Offices. The post of Field Intelligence Officers was introduced as a result of the Ratcliffe report³ as well the formation of the National Drugs Intelligence Unit. The next step, the creation of a national intelligence organisation to combat crime was a result of the Dickens report.⁴
4. In 1993, the Audit Commission published a report into police effectiveness regarding crime.⁵ The report identified three significant problems with police organisation as it stood. These were: the lack of an integrated approach to crime, ineffective utilisation of police resources and an investigative focus on crimes rather than criminals. Finding the resources and status of police intelligence lacking, the Audit Commission recommended forces increase the proactivity of detective work along with the targeting of 'known criminals' by utilising intelligence techniques.
5. This 'new model' policing strategy encouraged police responses to more than crime occurrence. By examining crime patterns, cultivating informants and using information gathering and surveillance techniques; sufficient evidence of criminal activity to support a prosecution, without a need to rely on confession evidence, would be obtained. As such 'intelligence' would replace

¹ ACPO Report of Sub-Committee on Criminal Intelligence 1975.

² ACPO Steering Committee on Criminal Information Systems Working Party Report 1978.

³ ACPO Report of the Working Party on Operational Intelligence 1986.

⁴ Report on the Regional Crime Squads 1990.

⁵ Helping With Inquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively, HMSO, London 1993.

the interviewing of suspects as the main way to achieve a conviction.

6. This shift to 'intelligence-led' policing has been supported by the development of strategic approaches to crime control that, in turn, have generated significant organisational change. Since the early 1980s various initiatives (such as 'crime desks,' 'operational/administrative support units' or 'pro-active teams') have sought to improve the efficiency of policing reactions and focus scarcer resources more appropriately. Not all of these were tried in Dyfed-Powys. The increasing volume of information generated by these initiatives has challenged organisational capabilities to capture and use all of the data effectively.
7. Criminal intelligence analysis uses uniform techniques to understand criminal networks and analyse the scale and patterns of criminal activity. Operational analysis has proven to be an effective tool in investigations. In the 1990s, strategic forms of criminal intelligence analysis were also developed and crime pattern analysis has become a well-used method for policy making. Intelligence, as a concept, seeks to provide a bridge between otherwise separate perceptions. It seeks to fill the gap between known criminal activity and proven criminal activity.
8. The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), recognising the shift from reactive investigations towards more proactive policing, identified a need to ensure intelligence-led policing was conducted in a professional and effective manner. Coupled to this was the need to ensure consistent and common standards of policing.
9. The Crime Committee of ACPO engaged the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) to develop a common framework for intelligence for use by law enforcement agencies. NCIS produced the National Intelligence Model (NIM), an extension of the Intelligence Cycle originally developed by the American Central Intelligence Agency⁶.
10. The Model is intended to provide a template in which the intelligence processes within a police force should operate. The NIM has been fully endorsed by the government. Part of the current programme of police reform includes a central government expectation that all police forces in the United Kingdom will adopt the NIM by April 2004 and central funding has been provided to facilitate this.

⁶ As originally envisaged, the CIA Intelligence Cycle was a five-step process. Policymakers (the planners and directors) would initiate requests for intelligence that would then be collected, processed, analysed and then disseminated back to the planners and directors. Harris and Godfrey in *Basic Elements of Intelligence* (Ed. Drexel), U.S. Government Printing Office 1971.

The National Intelligence Model⁷ (NIM)

11. The National Criminal Intelligence Service developed the National Intelligence Model to help provide a more professional approach to intelligence, particularly in the areas of:
- ✓ Best practice,
 - ✓ Professional knowledge,
 - ✓ Selection and identification of staff and
 - ✓ Training requirements.
- It is also intended that the model will facilitate processes that:
- ✓ Support local policing delivery,
 - ✓ Secure community safety through partnership working,
 - ✓ Manage risk and performance and
 - ✓ Account for financial resources.
12. Dyfed-Powys Police had already developed intelligence processes that reflected aspects of National Intelligence Model and, as such, formed a basis upon which the NIM could be implemented across the Force. These were subject to a 'Gap Analysis' in September 2000.⁸
13. The NIM is designed to impact three identified tiers of policing 'business'; local, cross-border and finally serious and organised. This 'business' can be crime, criminals, disorder or general community problems. The NIM splits these into three levels that closely reflected the existing bronze, silver and gold targeting levels used in Dyfed-Powys.⁹
14. The primary benefit of the NIM is to provide a structure that links 'business' planning directly to operational outcomes such as community safety, reducing crime and controlling criminality and disorder.

⁷ The following is a summary of 'The National Intelligence Model,' National Criminal Intelligence Service, London 2000.

⁸ The National Intelligence Model – Gap Analysis, A/Det. Insp. Mark Collins, Internal 2000.

⁹ These are summarised as follows:

Dyfed-Powys	NIM	Definition
Bronze	Level 1	Crimes, criminals and other problems affecting a BCU or small force area.
Silver		
Gold	Level 2	Cross border crimes affecting more than one BCU or force.
	Level 3	Serious and organised crime that can only be mainly dealt with by dedicated units or a national response.

15. The structure comprises four key components that are necessary to effectively achieve these desired operational outcomes. These components are;
 - ✓ The Tasking and Co-ordination Process,
 - ✓ Intelligence Products,
 - ✓ Knowledge Products and
 - ✓ System Products.
16. To achieve success, the NIM underlines that the Tasking and Co-ordination Process has to be led by managers who have appropriate authority to deploy the resources needed to address problems identified by the intelligence products using techniques and processes identified by the knowledge and system products.
17. There are four key intelligence products:
 - ✓ Strategic Intelligence Assessments,
 - ✓ Tactical Intelligence Assessments,
 - ✓ Target profiles and
 - ✓ Problem profiles.

These products result from the joint working of analysts and intelligence officers who collect, analyse and interpret information and then present it with recommendations and options for action.
18. Knowledge products are the guidance and rules by which police processes operate. System products are the facilities that allow the collection, recording, storage and use of information.
19. If the model is to function effectively, then it is necessary for there to be a properly functioning tasking and co-ordination group. Likewise, structures must be in place to ensure intelligence collection and analysis is properly organised, that the intelligence products are delivered and used.
20. It is also evident that the NIM is about more than just intelligence. It provides a business model of crime management. As such, the way it is used impacts both enforcement and preventative activities, that is crime management and reduction.
21. As the NIM has been developed by ACPO, and has achieved approval from central government, the BVRT consider that the model itself constitutes good practice. As such, the main scope of the review has been to establish the degree to which structures and processes within the Force comply with the NIM.

Figure 1: The National Intelligence Model



Terms of Reference

- 22.** The terms of reference set the scene for the intended review of Intelligence. The structure of the review is based on the nature and principles of 'Best Value.' The objective of the review is to ensure that the force can provide the most efficient, effective and economic Intelligence capability.
- 23.** As agreed by the Best Value Programme Board¹⁰, the Review was tasked to:
- ✓ Examine current approaches to the management and use of intelligence resources, within the Force, in relation to crime and disorder strategies.
 - ✓ Assess the effectiveness, efficiency and economy of Force intelligence processes, particularly in relation to criminal, community and roads policing intelligence, and review the implementation and adoption of the National Intelligence Model across the Force.
 - ✓ Compare current intelligence resources against workload and assess the potential impact of workload trends upon the Force.
 - ✓ Analyse the contribution of Force intelligence products to overarching Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership aims and objectives.¹¹
- The Review was not to: Examine intelligence issues relating to Special Branch activities.
- 24.** The Terms of Reference will reflect the requirement of the Review Team to balance budgetary responsibilities with the potential impact of the service area upon policing in the community.

¹⁰ Agreed on 16 January 2002. This was the effective start date for the review.

¹¹ The Best Value Programme Board agreed an amendment to the terms of reference to remove a requirement to assess the asset confiscation processes in the Force. These will now be subject to a separate Best Value Review.

Review Methodology

25. The Best Value Review Team (BVRT) carried out a review based upon the following methodology;
- Analysis of inspection protocol set by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) based upon European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM) principles,
 - Consideration of the Terms of Reference of the review.
 - The Review Team's own toolkit including:
 - ✓ Challenging service provision (through interviews with managers and stakeholders);
 - ✓ Comparing capability with other organisations (using benchmarking techniques);
 - ✓ Consulting internal and external stakeholders (through interviews);
 - ✓ Assessing competitiveness;
 - Identifying development strategies for intelligence processes.
26. In order to ensure compliance with the 4 C's a strategic resource audit was conducted to establish whether the service could absorb demand. The audit looked at all resources that are human, financial and physical.
27. The BVRT methodology also examined District Audit principles in terms of quality of service and costs of service provision. The HMIC and District Audit principles led the review into a comparison process with other forces.

The Comparison Element

28. Comparisons were conducted at two basic levels. Firstly, Force structures and resources were compared with other forces identified, through Home Office Crime and Disorder Partnership Families, as having similar socio-economic and demographic factors that can be shown to correlate geographically with the level of crime and disorder at a Local Authority level.¹² Secondly, Divisional or Basic Command Unit (BCU) structures, resources and demands were compared against similar BCUs.¹³

¹² Specifically CDRP family 12. The identified forces were Durham, Northumbria*, Cumbria*, North Yorkshire*, Derbyshire, Lincolnshire*, Norfolk*, West Mercia*, Suffolk, Devon & Cornwall*, Dorset, Gloucestershire, Avon & Somerset and North Wales*. (*For Force level comparisons The BVRT chose to focus on those with 2 or more identified similar local authorities)

¹³ As identified by Home Office sponsored research, all four of the Dyfed-Powys BCUs fall into BCU family 12. The other BCUs in this family are Carlisle & Penrith (Cumbria), Western (North Wales), North Northumberland, South West Northumberland (Northumbria) and Hereford (West Mercia). Detailed comparative information on BCU family 12 is held at Appendix

29. Critical success factors were identified, by the team, relating to effective and economic provision of intelligence functions. These factors included:
 - ✓ The number of officers and support staff devoted to intelligence,
 - ✓ Supervision of intelligence functions and
 - ✓ Location of functions.
30. The BVRT also examined intelligence processes in other forces identified, by HMIC, police journals or District Audit, as possessing particular elements of good practice in relation to intelligence. For example, Lancashire Constabulary are identified as leaders in the integration of Problem Orientated Policing with routine policing, Dorset and Cheshire are noted as encouraging electronic transfer of intelligence.
31. Broader comparisons have been made with processes and practices in other organisations such as police forces and departments in Scotland and the United States of America, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).¹⁴

The Consultation Element

32. The BVRT conducted consultation both internally and externally.
33. Internally, semi-structure interviews were conducted with staff directly involved in the intelligence process. These were preceded by a perceptual questionnaire. An intranet-based survey was also conducted to obtain the views and opinions of officers and support staff who use intelligence processes.
34. External consultation was conducted with a number of agencies. In particular, the BVRT interviewed the NCIS project team responsible for overseeing implementation of the NIM across England and Wales. They were particularly asked to identify good practice in intelligence processes. Similar conversations were conducted with intelligence representatives in other forces.
35. Intelligence processes are not a service that the Force provides directly to the public. As such, no direct public consultation was conducted other than that implied through the presence of a Police Authority Member on the BVRT.

¹⁴ A number of organisations lay claim to being the first to introduce intelligence led policing and intelligence processes into police work. The RCMP traces its intelligence-led policing to 1873 and the activities of the North-West Mounted Police, and its use of intelligence for strategic policing purposes to the 1970s.

The Competition Element

36. Competition involves assessing whether the intelligence processes can be provided in an alternative fashion, such as through utilisation of a private sector company. Given the nature of intelligence, this area was not pursued.

The Challenge Element

37. Under the Best Value process in Dyfed-Powys, the Challenge Element is split into two distinct parts. Challenge 'A' asks whether there is a specific need to provide intelligence processes for and by the Force. The answer to this question provides a basis for the degree to which the other aspects of Best Value (Comparison, Competition and Consultation) need to be undertaken.
38. The second element, the Challenge 'B' involves assessing whether the service provided is a good one. This is achieved through an assessment of the results of the Comparison, Consultation and Competition phases.
39. The circulation of a draft of this report to Chief Officer Group and managers responsible for the provision of intelligence services provides a final extension of the challenge process.

Human Rights Compliance

40. The Best Value Review Process within Dyfed-Powys Police includes an audit function with regard to Human Rights compliance. The review team examined policies that relate to the functions of intelligence to ascertain that each policy had an identified owner, that it had been ratified with regard to Human Rights compliance, and that each review date had not expired.
41. Policies requiring action have been identified and referred to the appropriate section to ensure compliance.

The HMIC Judgements

42. The BVRT considered the inspection process engaged by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) involving two judgements:
43. Judgement 1 assesses whether the area under review provides a good service when compared with other service providers. Judgement 2 examines whether the recommendations contained in the review will drive improvement.

Notes


Baseline Information

44. Dyfed-Powys is, in terms of geography, the largest police force in England and Wales covering some 1,094,000 hectares. The resident population consists of approximately 479,400 individuals in 172,634 households. In addition, over the course of a year, there can be an estimated 13 million visitors to the Force area.

Human Resources

45. Within the Force area, Dyfed-Powys Police operates intelligence facilities at two separate levels. Force-wide intelligence is channelled through the Force Intelligence Bureau (FIB) based in Force Headquarters, Llangunnor. Divisional or BCU intelligence is conducted through division intelligence cells linked to the local Crime Investigation Department (CID) structure. Dependent upon this structure, each BCU will have 1, 2 or 3 intelligence cells. The basic structure is shown in figure 2.


Figure 2: Force Intelligence Structure



46. Additionally the Force has links to other intelligence structures at a Regional and National level. These are directed through the Headquarters Crime Management and Reduction Department (CMRD).
47. The responsibility for the BCU intelligence cells lies with the Divisional Commanders via the Divisional Detective Inspectors. The Force Intelligence Bureau is managed by the Detective Inspector responsible for C1 (Special Branch) with ultimate responsibility to

the head of CMRD. Figure 3 details the management structure for intelligence processes.

Figure 3: Intelligence Supervisory Structures



48. The CMRD Det. Supt. currently chairs the Regional Intelligence Sub-Group. This provides a linkage for Force operations and intelligence to other forces and law enforcement agencies. The Force Intelligence Bureau represents Dyfed-Powys on the group to facilitate the processing of nominations for regional and national intelligence targets.
49. In addition to this structure there is a dedicated intelligence cell attached to the Ports Policing Unit.
50. Each Divisional Intelligence Cell consists of three people, a Field Intelligence Officer (generally a Detective Constable), a Crime Support Officer and a Local Intelligence Clerk (these two roles are performed by support staff).
51. The number of intelligence cells in each BCU varies as shown in table one. The number, and location, of intelligence cells in some BCUs reflects the number and location of Divisional pro-active teams. Otherwise, the location of the cell is matched to the location of Detective Inspectors.

Table 1: Current Divisional Intelligence Establishment

BCU	Number of Intelligence Cells	Field Intelligence Officers	Crime Support Officers	Local Intelligence Officers	Locations
Carmarthenshire BCU	3	3	3	3	Ammanford Carmarthen Llanelli
Ceredigion BCU	1	1	1	1	Aberystwyth
Pembrokeshire BCU	2	2	2	2	Haverfordwest Pembroke Dock
Powys BCU	2	2	2	2	Brecon Newtown

52. The full resources of a Divisional Intelligence Cell are generally available Monday through to Friday during normal working hours. Field Intelligence Officers are available, on rotation, some Saturdays. Supervisory responsibility for the Divisional Intelligence Cells falls with the local Detective Inspector. That person can also hold responsibility for a pro-active team.
53. Criminal Intelligence aspects of FIB are provided by three staff. These are a Detective Sergeant, one Detective Constable and the Force Analyst. The main purpose and aims of this team are¹⁵:
- ✓ To provide Dyfed-Powys with a creative, dynamic and where possible a predictive criminal intelligence service, thereby assisting in crime prevention and detection and the efficient and effective deployment of resources,
 - ✓ To provide a quality service in the gathering, collation, evaluation, analysis and development of relevant information and intelligence about crime and criminals,
 - ✓ To maintain and develop a fully integrated and networked Force Intelligence System.
 - ✓ To evaluate and contribute towards inter-force analysis of crime trends and develop targets via the Regional Intelligence Sub-Group.
 - ✓ To represent the Force at Regional/National level ensuring the organisation is kept abreast of emerging best practice.
54. The same document lists the 16 main functions of the FIB as:
- ✓ To stimulate the flow of intelligence both from within and outside the Force and provide a central liaison point in relation to telecommunication companies; Crimewatch UK and Crimestoppers; HM Prison Service; Interpol; NCIS; HM Customs & Excise, British Motor Insurers; Missing Persons and National Crime Faculty,

¹⁵ Source; *ibid.*

- ✓ To provide specialist intelligence, liaison and/or expertise in relation to: drugs intelligence; itinerant crime; Hells Angels; football intelligence; pay parties and raves; New Age Travellers; organised vehicle theft; antiques and fine arts,
- ✓ To provide a central liaison point for the pharmaceutical industry and for the illicit use of drug precursor chemicals,
- ✓ Co-ordinate and evaluate the utilisation of the Chemist Visit database,
- ✓ To maintain a register of Sex Offenders,
- ✓ To co-ordinate disclosure of information in relation to child access checks,
- ✓ To provide appropriate data to SCAS and monitor compliance,
- ✓ To provide central reference point and specialist support in relation to offences of kidnapping and product contamination,
- ✓ To provide specialist intelligence support to major incidents when necessary,
- ✓ To co-ordinate access to and development of the Force Intelligence System,
- ✓ To monitor prison releases and compliance with Home Detention Curfew scheme,
- ✓ To accept, develop, action and distribute target packages on force-wide problems in accordance with force policy and co-ordinate cross-border intelligence functions.
- ✓ To provide input to training courses re: FIB, crime analysis and other relevant areas,
- ✓ To analyse organised crime or crime activity; produce strategic and tactical assessments; prepare graphical and other analytical documentation or evidence as required,
- ✓ To provide guidance to officers in relation to analysis carried out at area level,
- ✓ Provide international Epi-centre access in furtherance of crime investigation.

- 55.** In response to major incidents or special operations, the Force can also form ad-hoc intelligence cells using existing intelligence personnel.

Physical Resources

- 56.** The primary tool for gathering and holding intelligence information is the Force Intelligence System, a computer based networked database. Intelligence submitted by officers, in the form of manually

compiled intelligence logs¹⁶ is then manually input onto this system. The inputting facility is generally provided by the Local Intelligence Clerk in the BCU Intelligence Cell, or by dedicated inputters in Headquarters FIB.

57. The Intelligence Cells and FIB also have access to all Force computer systems including the Police National Computer (PNC). The Intranet provides a basic search facility of all the Force databases. The Crime System (CS) provides details of recorded crimes to assist in identifying crime trends. Some intelligence cells also have Internet access.
58. Staff also have indirect access to inter-Force resources such as CEDRIC - Customs Intelligence Information, and Epi Centre – the European Police Information System.
59. Through the Scientific Support Unit, access can also be gained to a number of other databases and information such as those relating to DNA, other forensic evidence and sexual offences. These include the National DNA database and the Police Elimination Database.
60. As part of the first phase of the NIM Implementation rollout, the Force received £115,000 towards the purchase of specialist software. A specific intelligence package I₂ was bought for use by the Force Analyst and the Crime Support Officers in Intelligence Cells. At a basic level, the package allows information to be turned into graphical charts for ease of analysis and interpretation. I₂ software is used by law enforcement agencies across the world.

Financial Resources

61. The allocated costs charged for Force Intelligence Units for the 2001/2002 period was £560,215.32. This represents 0.89% of the overall Force budget.¹⁷ The majority of this budget is dedicated to pay. However, detailed inspection indicates that this may not be an accurate costing for the provision of the intelligence function. For example, salaries for Divisional intelligence support staff are not included in the costing yet overtime payments for non-intelligence staff are.
62. Basic pay costs for dedicated HQ and Divisional Intelligence staff is £620,607.00 based on establishment (including BCU intelligence staff).

¹⁶ Specifically Force Form C600b (i) Dyfed-Powys Police – Intelligence Report.

¹⁷ Source: Force Finance Department

Figure 4: Pay Costs 2001/2002 based on Finance data¹⁸





Figure 5: Approximate Pay Costs 2001/2002 based on establishment.




63. When compared against activity analysis data¹⁹, the following table may give an indication of possible costs, in respect of intelligence resources, across the various stages of the intelligence process.

¹⁸ Source: Force Finance

¹⁹ Activity Analysis of Intelligence functions undertaken by BVRT in February/March 2002. 954 person/hours of activity were captured.

Figure 6: Activity based costing of intelligence functions 2001/2002²⁰



- 64.** Processing includes time spent of the evaluation of intelligence. During the period 3.5% of time was spent on evaluation of individual logs, by Field Intelligence Officers, at a cost of £17,244.80. In general terms, provision of intelligence services costs the Force £538.90 per hour.
- 65.** The BVRT would, however, underline that these costings are a general indicator. There is some debate as to the accuracy of financial data allocated to the intelligence function. This will have to be clarified in the future to facilitate accurate activity based costing. The new finance management system may assist in this.


Main Demands

- 66.** In 2001/2, a total of 13,142 intelligence logs were recorded on CIS. This was a 29 per cent increase on the total recorded from the year 2001 (10,170). 2000 saw a total of 8197 logs input.²¹
- 67.** Figure 7 provides a breakdown on the number of logs generated through each divisional intelligence cell. A further 1586 logs were directly recorded by Headquarters FIB in 2002 (2109 and 2161 in 2000 & 2001) and an additional 99 by the Ports Unit (98 in 2000 and 71 in 2001).

²⁰ This cross refers financial data from Force Finance with activity analysis data collected by the BVRT.

²¹ Source: Force Intelligence Bureau.

Figure 7: Intelligence Logs received 2000 to 2002



68. Local intelligence cells also act as the repositories for A271 Stop Check, A271 Stop Search and register A273 Premises Searched records. Intelligence cells differ in the way they use and publish data based these records. For example some can provide data based on the financial year, others can only provide data based on the calendar year.

69. On average an intelligence cell on Division will expect to handle, in any twelve month period, around:

- ✓ 700-2000 Stop Check forms,
- ✓ 300-1200 Stop Search forms and
- ✓ 300 Premises Searched forms.

Intelligence Provision

- 70.** Authorities are expected to provide evidence that the rationale for service provision has been examined. The legislation in this respect is set out in Statutory Instrument 3251 of 1999 that implements the Local Government Act 1999. Department for the Environment, Transport and the Regions Circular 10/99 also constitutes statutory guidance under the Act. The key requirements for reviews, under Best Value, are:
- a) consider whether the authority should be exercising the function;
 - b) consider the level at which, and the way in which, it should be exercising the function;
 - c) consider its objectives in relation to the exercise of the function.
- 71.** Law enforcement is about the successful management and reduction of crime and related problems. Intelligence is central to policing activity where local and government objectives, good policing performance and value for money is considered.
- 72.** The National Intelligence Model provides a mechanism to link policing problems with business planning and specific outcomes such as improved community safety and crime and disorder reduction.
- 73.** The Home Office National Policing Plan 2003-06²² stipulates that all police forces should implement the National Intelligence Model, to commonly accepted minimum standards by April 2004 at the latest.
- 74.** Application of the National Intelligence Model, including effective tasking and co-ordination processes, proper management of Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS), investment in analysis and good use of evaluative assessments are aspects of Divisional policing commended by HMIC.²³
- 75.** The BVRT would therefore conclude that it is incumbent upon the Force to provide police intelligence services, as part of its policing activities, for the public of Dyfed-Powys.
- 76.** Similarly, in line with both ACPO and Home Office guidance, and the contents of the National Policing Plan, the intelligence structures and processes within the Force must conform to the NIM.

²² National Policing Plan 2003-06.Draft 10 October 2002.

²³ Getting Down to Basics, Emerging findings from BCU inspections in 2001 – HMIC, February 2002.

Recommendation 1	The Intelligence Services provided by the Force, at Headquarters and Divisional levels, must conform to the requirements of the National Intelligence Model
Financial Benefit	None noted. Full implementation of the NIM will incur costs in the short term. Medium and longer-term projections suggest eventual savings based on increased efficient and effective use of police resources coupled with improved financial management.
Other Benefits	The efficient, effective and economic use of police resources to facilitate crime prevention and detection and improve community safety.

Planning and Direction

77. Planning and direction is the key to managing the entire intelligence process, from identifying the need to gather particular types of information to delivering an individual intelligence product to an end user.
78. Planning and direction is both the beginning and the end of the intelligence cycle. It is the beginning because it involves identifying and drawing up the specific information collection requirements. It is also the end because the finished intelligence products should be the information that supports management decisions and generates new requirements.
79. Within the context of the NIM the Planning and Direction aspects of the Intelligence Cycle are delivered through the Tasking and Co-ordination Meeting. This is conducted at two levels, strategic and tactical.
80. Within Dyfed-Powys Police these two levels are monitored by, respectively, a Headquarters and 4 Divisional Co-ordination and Tasking Groups.
81. HMIC inspection guidance in relation to implementation of the NIM at BCU level requires:
 - ✓ A strategic assessment of crime and disorder policing problems in the area,
 - ✓ A written control strategy indicating priorities and how resources are deployed,
 - ✓ A structure of tasking and co-ordinating group meetings, at strategic (quarterly) and tactical (fortnightly) levels.

Strategic Tasking and Co-ordination

82. Strategic tasking and co-ordination meetings are conducted to establish or review the overall priorities for the Force and earmark the main resource requirements in support of those priorities. The priorities set by the meeting should arise out of problems and issues identified by a strategic intelligence assessment coupled with consideration of local and governmental policing objectives. NIM good practice suggests such a meeting should occur either quarterly or half-yearly in a manner linked to the business planning cycle.
83. This strategic meeting also balances the demands created through force operational processes with co-ordination of plans agreed with local partners through the Crime and Disorder Act. It is here that the strategic priorities for crime prevention and crime detection are considered in concert.

- 84.** As a Force, Dyfed-Powys Police covers four Local Authority Areas. With four co-terminous BCUs, the focus of co-ordination of crime and disorder strategy resides more at a divisional than a Force level.
- 85.** In intelligence terms, Dyfed-Powys Police has a designated Headquarters Co-ordination and Tasking Group that meets on a monthly basis. The make up of the group is as follows (although there is the flexibility to co-opt additional personnel to the group for specific reasons such as Divisional managers):
- ✓ Detective Superintendent,
 - ✓ Detective Chief Inspector,
 - ✓ Detective Inspector Central Detective Unit,
 - ✓ Detective Inspector Force Intelligence Bureau/ C1,
 - ✓ Divisional Detective Inspector and
 - ✓ Field Intelligence representatives.
- 86.** The stated function of this group is to discuss and evaluate intelligence targets nominated for potential action at a Force, Regional or National level. This includes problem profiles and identified crime hot spots but with an emphasis on enforcement activity. Originally there was no direct prevention input from HQ Community Safety. However, during the course of the review the Community Safety Superintendent has begun to attend the group.
- 87.** The group can provide assessments, to the Detective Chief Superintendent of CMRD, of likely personnel, physical and financial resource implications of potential action.
- 88.** The scope of this meeting falls short of the strategic tasking and co-ordination envisaged by the NIM. Primarily, the meeting does not have the implicit authority to allocate non-CID resources nor set Force policy needed to deliver the overall crime control strategy for the Force area. In part, this is dealt with by an annual meeting between the Chief Officer (Operations) and the CMRD Detective Chief Superintendent.
- 89.** The role of Headquarters goes beyond the co-ordination and tasking of headquarters intelligence and detective assets and provides a communication link between Divisional tasking and co-ordination and Regional tasking and co-ordination meetings. Resource allocation is decided through agreement with BCU commanders and HQ specifically funds joint targeting activities to encourage BCU involvement.
- 90.** The NCIS NIM Implementation Team have also specifically recommended that the Force Strategic Tasking and Co-ordination Group (TCG) should be meeting quarterly and that a control

strategy is required to move business forward.²⁴ The Force Target Setting Group does meet some of this requirement.

91. A 'gap-analysis' in relation to the NIM was carried out across the Force in September 2000.²⁵ That review identified and recommended that Strategic Tasking and Co-ordination Meetings should be held quarterly at Divisional level (with an option to hold additional meetings if circumstances demanded).
92. Current CMRD guidance identifies that each BCU should have a Divisional Co-ordination and Tasking Group made up as follows:
 - ✓ Divisional Commander,
 - ✓ Detective Inspector,
 - ✓ Uniform Inspector,
 - ✓ Detective Sergeant (Proactive Unit)
 - ✓ Field Intelligence Officer,
 - ✓ Crime Support Officer.
93. The function of the Divisional Tactical Group, in Force guidance, is to meet monthly to discuss and evaluate nominations for intelligence targeting and to assess implicit resource implications. Problem profiles can be discussed and the group should also identify those officers who will assume responsibility for progressing divisional level targets. Targets requiring more resources than the division can supply are forwarded to the HQ Tasking and Co-ordinating Group.
94. It can be difficult to convene these meetings. In one BCU the full group could be convened with 6 personnel and the entire division would be represented. For another BCU, no less than sixteen personnel would be required to ensure all intelligence cells and proactive teams are represented, but this would still exclude a number of divisional Uniform Inspectors. There is no need for all personnel to attend as they can inform the intelligence process via other means (such as e-mail etc) but there are benefits to face-to-face discussion.
95. As with the HQ group meetings, the membership was primarily of enforcement staff with no direct involvement from Community Safety specialists to allow a broader assessment of preventative tactical options. However, over the course of the review Community Safety staff have become involved in the process.
96. The NIM suggests that, typically, the manager with senior operational responsibility for the area should chair single agency tasking and co-ordination meetings. Applying this to the existing

²⁴ Letter DCI P.Holewell (NCIS) to DSupt V.Lewis (CMRD), 5th June 2002.

²⁵ The National Intelligence Model – Gap Analysis, Acting Detective Inspector Mark Collins (Sept 2000).

Divisional Co-ordinating and Tasking Groups implies that the group is a strategic one, given the presence of the Divisional commander.

97. However, to be a fully strategic meeting there should also be clear occasion to develop and set strategic direction for policing activity. The NIM recommends this should be done quarterly or half-yearly. Currently, in BCUs, senior management will hold an annual meeting to discuss the priorities and implementation of the Annual Policing Plan. For this to be fully NIM compliant, the group assessing the annual policing plan should also be reviewing priorities for intelligence work (both prevention and enforcement) and be allocating resources appropriately.

Tactical Tasking and Co-ordination

98. Tactically the NIM requires tasking and co-ordination to occur much more frequently, even weekly. The BVRT would consider, however, that it is not possible to be prescriptive as to frequency. At least, the frequency of meetings should be proportionate to the frequency and scale of local problems. The three key roles of the tactical tasking and co-ordination meeting are to:

- ✓ To commission and apply a *tactical menu* to the strategy set out by the Strategic tasking and co-ordination process,
- ✓ To respond to new needs and
- ✓ To ensure agreed plans and enforcement activity are still in line with the overall objectives.

99. The agenda for the tactical tasking and co-ordination meeting is led by the tactical assessment. Behind the decision making process is a menu of four key elements:

- ✓ The targeting of offenders in line with the overall objectives,
- ✓ The management of crime and disorder hotspots,
- ✓ The investigation of crimes and incidents that are linked,
- ✓ The application of crime prevention measures such as CCTV or community initiatives.

100. In order to be effective, the tactical tasking and co-ordination meeting must ensure that those allocated responsibility for taking action as directed by the meeting, are accountable for the outcomes. The review of progress on tactical activities, such as targeting operations, is a critical responsibility for the meeting. Additional key roles include taking account of new and emerging issues and monitoring the quantity and quality of intelligence material.

101. There is a need for this reviewing process to take place at two levels within Dyfed-Powys. Even if the current Divisional Co-

ordinating and Tasking Group is considered a tactical group, there still remains scope for additional tactical activity at lower levels. This is particularly the case given the geographical area and nature of the Force and the internal structure of some of the BCUs.

- 102.** At a Divisional Level senior managers currently attend separate Crime & Disorder (strategic) and Tasking & Co-ordination (tactical) Meetings. While input through both channels is necessary to provide a strategic overview of issues within a BCU, proper implementation of the NIM process allows for these inputs to be provided together. Otherwise, important information may be missed, resources may be inappropriately allocated and a true tactical picture of the Divisional may not emerge.
- 103.** Currently, within Dyfed-Powys, this potential problem is addressed by conducting the two meetings 'back-to-back' on the same day.
- 104.** In his NIM 'Gap Analysis,'²⁶ then Acting/DI Mark Collins recommended that the Force establish Section Tasking and Co-ordination meetings, chaired by Uniform Inspectors and reporting to the Divisional Tasking and Co-ordinating Group. He envisaged that these would take a similar format to the Divisional meetings with attendees including Detective Sergeants, Local Beat Officers and Uniform Sergeants. Additional liaison could be conducted with the local intelligence cell.
- 105.** Powys BCU has recently implemented separate Tasking and Co-ordination Meetings for its northern and southern sectors, centring on Newtown and Brecon, as well as an additional meeting for the Llandrindod Wells area. These are weekly meetings and reflect the structure of Chief Inspectors in the BCU.
- 106.** Pembrokeshire BCU operates separate Crime Management Meetings based on the North and South of the BCU, with additional tasking meetings being held at Section level.
- 107.** The range and nature of these meetings is considerable with some displaying more awareness of and compliance with the NIM than others. What the structures do have in common is that they reflect BCU preference rather than any corporacy on the part of the Force.
- 108.** The emphasis of the NIM, and its close links with intelligence processes, may provide a clue as to the most appropriate location for Tasking and Co-ordination Meetings to be conducted below the Divisional level. Properly conducted Tasking and Co-ordination Meetings will require a degree of analytical capacity, responsibility for both uniform and pro-active resources and input on preventative

²⁶ The National Intelligence Model – Gap Analysis, Acting Detective Inspector Mark Collins (Sept 2000).

measures. At the moment, most of these resources are available through the local pro-active unit and intelligence cell structure.

- 109.** The NIM recommends that these Tactical Tasking and Co-ordination Meetings are conducted weekly although the HMIC inspection template requires them to be held fortnightly. The BVRT would again suggest conduct should be proportionate to local demand.
- 110.** The NIM provides an effective template within which Tasking and Co-ordination meetings can be carried out. This template lays out the four key purposes of the Tasking and Co-ordination Group discussions:
- ✓ Targeting offenders,
 - ✓ Management of Crime and Disorder hot spots,
 - ✓ Investigation of linked crimes and incidents series,
 - ✓ The application of preventative measures.

Identified Good Practice

BCU use of corporate NIM template for Tasking and Co-ordination Meetings.

- 111.** Throughout this chapter it has been implied that the existing Headquarters and Divisional Co-ordination and Tasking Groups originally lacked the full range of tactical options required by the NIM (although the inclusion of Community Safety staff is redressing this concern). A range of Home Office research has previously examined the use of Crime Management Models²⁷, of which Tasking and Co-ordination is an adjunct. Developing the supporting intelligence unit is critical to the success of a Crime Management Model but so is the balance between reactive and proactive policing.
- 112.** The NIM has sought to achieve this balance by the way targets, crime and disorder, crime series and crime prevention are discussed in a structured way.
- 113.** Newtown station, in Powys BCU, has been experimenting with the positioning of the intelligence cell and community safety resources together (although not under unified management).
- 114.** Initial reactions to this experiment have been mixed. Consultation with staff in other BCUs highlighted a range of concerns about such a linking of intelligence and community safety. These ranged primarily from concerns about accommodation to concerns about confidentiality given the range of meetings Community Safety Officers have with outside agencies.

²⁷ For Example; Developing and Evaluating A Crime Management Model, Home Office Police Research Papers 18 (1996) – Amey, Hale and Uglow.

- 115.** Initial indications of the Newtown experiment, as evidenced by the Tasking and Co-ordination minutes generated, are of an improved range of tactical policing options with which to address policing and community problems.
- 116.** Within the Force this potential has not been discussed in a structured or corporate manner. It is not proposed to fully explore the use or advantages of a corporate Crime Management Model here.²⁸ However there may be lessons to be learnt from the Newtown experiment.


²⁸ A concurrent Best Value Review of Community Safety is assessing the role of Community Safety Officers.

NOTES

Collection

- 117.** Collection is the preliminary phase of the role of intelligence processes in relation to the rest of the Force. Information from members of the public, other forces and from officers is combined with information from Force databases and other media.
- 118.** The success of the intelligence process depends on a continuous flow of relevant, accurate and current information from all possible sources. Operational officers, regardless of rank or position, are encouraged to develop potential sources of intelligence. Information obtained can then be fed into the Force intelligence systems.
- 119.** The main foundation of the Force intelligence collection process is the C600b form, also known as an intelligence log. The submitting officer manually records all intelligence received on the form and forwards it, via his supervisor, to the local intelligence cell. The intelligence collection process is shown in figure overleaf.
- 120.** Guidance on the intelligence process operated within Dyfed-Powys Police is provided by a CMRD guidance document 'A Simple Guide to the Intelligence Process.' This twenty-six-page document is available to all officers via the Force Intranet. Specific input has also been provided to Probationer Constables since 1998/1999.
- 121.** The BVRT tested the awareness of a sample of officers, in relation to this guide, by way of an Intranet based questionnaire²⁹. Figure 8 shows the familiarity of officers with the guide.


Figure 8: Officer familiarity with Intelligence Guide



²⁹ Total respondents consisted of 24 supervisors (12% of Force complement) and 42 constables (5% of Force complement).

122. It is apparent that, of those responding to the survey, a third of Constables and nearly a fifth of supervisors have no knowledge of the guide at all. Higher levels of awareness were exhibited by officers with pro-active or intelligence backgrounds.

Figure 9: Intelligence collection process




Area for Development	Options for Change
Improve dissemination of guidance on the intelligence process within Dyfed-Powys Police	<p>Option 1: Do nothing.</p> <p>Option 2: Provide a copy of 'A Simple Guide to the Intelligence Process' to all operational officers. (@1,200 copies – photocopying costs only).</p> <p>Option 3: Issue a reminder of the existence of the guide via Routine Orders.</p> <p>Option 4: Provide an edited version of 'A Simple Guide' (excluding appendices and FIB data) to all operational officers). (@1,200 copies – photocopying costs only).</p>

Recommendation 2	Issue a reminder in Routine Orders of the 'A Simple Guide to the Intelligence Process'.
Financial Cost/Benefit	Neutral
Other Benefits	Improved awareness of intelligence processes, responsibilities and procedure.


- 123.** The NIM implementation team are looking at developing an aide memoir template, about the NIM, for use by individual officers. As published, it may be appropriate for the force to distribute this to all operational officers.
- 124.** Individual officers are encouraged to take ownership of the intelligence log and act on any information it may contain. So, if an officer has obtained information about a possible drug dealer the officer could obtain a warrant to search the premises of the identified individual.
- 125.** From the Intranet survey of officers, 95% of constables state that they personally act upon the intelligence that they submit.
- 126.** The information submitted, checks conducted and action proposed should also be assessed by the officer's supervisor. Supervisory officers also have a responsibility for considering or initiating action in relation to the intelligence provided. Figure 10 shows the proportion of supervisors who develop such action plans.

Figure 10: Proportion of supervisors who develop action plans.



127. These action plans are developed to cover a range of crime and disorder issues. However, the majority of action plans drawn up by supervisors relate to drug matters. Figure 11 provides a breakdown.

Figure 11: Activities action plans relate to.



128. It is not apparent that this range of activity accurately reflects the planned policing activities laid out by Ministerial, Police Authority and Divisional priorities. Headquarters CMRD have produced a template for *‘the problem solving approach to crime and other incidents’*³⁰ for use by operational officers. Although this template allows for action plans to be evaluated and assessed, the form itself provides no incentive to link local action plans to higher level strategic planning (other than that implied by having the action plan authorised by a ‘divisional co-ordinator’).

129. There is scope to clearly assess proposed action plans in terms of their direct contribution to Divisional and Force priorities. The HMIC inspection protocol for NIM Implementation at the BCU level requires there to be *‘robust monitoring of activity and performance.’* The BVRT would presume that this carries an implication that action plan activity and performance are being monitored against overarching aims and priorities.

Area for Development	Options for Change
5Clearly link Local Action Plans to Divisional and Force priorities	<p>Option 1: Do nothing. Action Plans remain, in the main, reactive to local problems.</p> <p>Option 2: Include a ‘tick box’ in POP forms from ‘The problem solving approach to crime and other incidents’ to clearly link the local action plan to higher priorities, to be completed by the divisional co-ordinator.</p>

³⁰ Provided as an appendix to ‘A Simple Guide to the Intelligence Process.’

Recommendation 3	Link local action plans to higher priorities³¹
Financial Benefit	None noted.
Other Benefits	Improved alignment of local activities with strategic and tactical priorities.

- 130.** It is evident that, dependent upon the availability of key individuals and resources to authorise or conduct action it can be some time before an intelligence log arrives with the local intelligence cell.
- 131.** Before a log is input onto the Criminal Intelligence System it will have passed through the hands of, at least, three people. Firstly the officer concerned will have drafted it. Then it will be checked and assessed for action by their supervisor. Upon arrival at the Intelligence Cell it will be quality controlled by the Local Intelligence Clerk prior to input to CIS.
- 132.** The key points at which the arrival of an intelligence log, with the intelligence cell, can be delayed are:
- ✓ Where Forces systems are checked,
 - ✓ Where action is conducted,
 - ✓ Where supervisors may not be available,
 - ✓ Where the intelligence cell may not be available.
- 133.** A question could also be raised as to whether all intelligence logs need to be input to Force intelligence systems, especially where the quality of information submitted may be low. However, such an assessment carries inherent risks. Information not regarded as important to one part of the Force may actually be vital to another.


Checking Force Systems

- 134.** Before submitting an intelligence log, an officer must check a range of Force and Police record systems to provide additional information. These include:
- ✓ CIS Check (to identify the person)
 - ✓ PNC Check (to identify criminal records, warnings etc)
 - ✓ PNC Vehicle Check (to identify vehicle owners/postcodes)
 - ✓ PNC VODS (using a post code to identify vehicles) and
 - ✓ Firearms Check (to see if the person has access to a firearm).
- 135.** To successfully complete these checks requires the officer to have the skills, time and equipment to access the relevant systems themselves. Alternatively they need to be able to contact someone who can access the systems for them. The BVRT survey of Constables and Supervisors sought to establish ease of access to these various systems.

³¹ There remains an understanding that flexibility may be required to meet local needs that are not reflected in Divisional and/or Force priorities.

136. Figure 12 shows the proportion of Constables who have ever had difficulty accessing individual systems. As can be seen, PNC checks are easy for nearly four-fifths of officers.


Figure 12: Constables who have ever had difficulty accessing systems to conduct specific checks.



137. The principle reasons for any difficulty stem from either lack of personal training, difficulty in finding a trained PNC operator at the local station or difficulty obtaining service from the PNC bureau. Computer system downtime may also be a factor in this.

138. The same question was posed to supervisors. As figure 13 shows supervisors seem to consider that their team members have easier access to the necessary system checks than their team members actually believe. However, the reasons given for the difficulty were the same as those given by Constables.

Figure 13: Do members of your team ever have difficulty conducting specific checks?



139. Consultation with intelligence cells suggested that a significant number of intelligence logs were reaching them without the appropriate checks having been completed by submitting officers. It would appear that one of the main reasons in that is the occasional

difficulty in accessing appropriate information systems. However, in general terms, this would not account for the absence of checks identified by intelligence cells.

- 140. An officer could only personally conduct all of the checks if they have access to an appropriate computer. CIS Checks and Firearms Checks are available through the Force Intranet on every operational terminal. This generally requires the officer to be in a police station but could be conducted remotely (e.g. by telephone). It is assumed that most intelligence logs are drafted within station confines.
- 141. PNC terminals are available at some stations across the BCUs. These allow the suitably trained officer direct access to the PNC. Often these are also used by staff from the intelligence cells.
- 142. The alternative is for the officer to conduct the checks, via a third party, over the telephone or by asking a colleague to access the appropriate systems. This latter option could mean that two operational officers are tied up doing the checks. The former option generally requires the facilities offered by the HQ PNC Bureau.
- 143. The Force Suggestion Scheme in February 2002 contained the idea that officers should be requesting, by telephone, a search of CIS at the same time as they are requesting a PNC check. This would provide for information held on local systems to be made available to officers through the use of a 'Structured Search Engine.'
- 144. The Force PNC Bureau and Operations Room have indicated that this would be difficult to carry out for two key reasons. First and foremost is the conflict between available resources and the additional demand generated. The second is the sheer quantity of material that such an information search would generate, unless the search is properly constructed.
- 145. The BVRT would maintain that the basic philosophy of providing access, by telephone or radio, to CIS for operational officers is a good one. Ideally, this would be conducted as a standard task in the same manner that PNC checks are currently requested and conducted. However, full assessment of this issue is beyond the scope of this review. It has been raised for detailed consideration by the Best Value Review of Information Technology Systems.

Recommendation 4	The Best Value Review of Information Technology Systems should examine integration of local and national systems and access to PNC.
Financial Benefit	Potential efficiency saving not costed at this time.
Other Benefits	Potential increase in frontline efficiency and effectiveness resulting from provision of better quality and up-to-date information.

- 146.** Consultation with the intelligence cells also indicated that often staff within the cells, particularly the Local Intelligence Clerk or CSO, will access these systems themselves to check or verify information submitted. Sometimes this will be as a quality control check. FIOs will also conduct the checks personally if the intelligence has been submitted incompletely.
- 147.** These additional checks carry a risk of duplication within the overall submission process. All of the checks involved, including those required of the submitting officer, will delay the arrival of the log with the local intelligence cell and delay input to the CIS.
- 148.** Arguably this can lead to a de-skilling of operational officers and reduce their ownership of the intelligence. This distills to an argument between the quality of service being provided and the speed with which it is provided.
- 149.** A number of forces, such as Dorset and Cheshire, have removed the requirement for officers to conduct system checks prior to submitting intelligence logs to the intelligence cell. In these forces, responsibility for conducting all necessary background and PNC checks falls to the clerk in the intelligence cell.
- 150.** For a brief period early in 2002, officers in Pembrokeshire experimented with the electronic submission of intelligence logs (C600b) from the originating officer to the intelligence cell. Officers would fill out their intelligence log at a computer terminal and then e-mail this through to the clerk or FIO.
- 151.** This practice was stopped because of concerns regarding security and integrity and because no evaluation had been undertaken by the Information Technology User Group.³² The IT department, via the Crime Support Group, were due to assess these concerns.
- 152.** The Force Data Protection Officer also noted possible concerns regarding the security of utilising E-mail in this way. It was noted that many Force computer terminals may be, effectively, open to any user. Current password protection may offset this but it is not apparent that all users conform to Force IT security policies. In theory local Detective Inspectors are responsible for conducting a risk assessment of local IT equipment utilisation, and formally recording their assessment.
- 153.** The Force intranet is currently secure for the transfer of information up to 'restricted' level which covers the majority of the Force's work but not all.

³² Minutes of Senior CID Conference 28.02.02, Item 13.

- 154.** The BVRT note, however, that the existing CIS is already directly linked to internal force e-mail facilities. Intelligence staff can set-up CIS to automatically e-mail them when specific files are accessed or information provided. This activity requires staff to possess a recorded user name and includes password provision.
- 155.** Both Dorset and Cheshire utilise procedures that allow operational officers to compile and electronically forward intelligence logs to the local clerk. Gwent Police have been operating a similar process since April 2001. None of the forces have reported particular concerns regarding data security. Dorset Police established their system in 1991.
- 156.** The Force Computer Development Team have indicated that CIS could be linked to the Intranet based SOAP system given several weeks development time. Intelligence logs, input by officers, could be stored directly into CIS following appropriate checks by the intelligence cell. This would remove the need, and potential loss or delay, for paper based intelligence logs.
- 157.** However, to be fully effective the system would have to be operable remotely otherwise officers would have to complete logs only within stations where they could access computers.

Area for Development	Options for Change
Reduce time taken for logs to reach intelligence cell.	<p>Option 1: Do nothing. Concern risk logs are lost in the submission process or delayed by postal error or officer absence.</p> <p>Option 2: The Force actively examines the electronic submission of intelligence logs.</p>

Recommendation 5	The Force should actively and formally examine the electronic submission of intelligence logs.
Financial Benefit	Potential efficiency saving not costed at this time.
Other Benefits	Potential increase in frontline efficiency and effectiveness resulting from provision of better quality and up-to-date information.

The Role of Supervisors

- 158.** The current C600b includes provision for a supervisor to include instructions or comments on the log as submitted by their team member. There is, however, no specific requirement for an officer to submit the log to their supervisor prior to the individual officer taking any action.
- 159.** Consultation indicated incidences of officers simply submitting logs to supervisors with little or no action being taken. There was, in these cases, a presumption that action was the responsibility of the supervisor rather than the individual officer. This goes against the

grain of an underlying tenet of Dyfed-Powys Police where all officers are encouraged to take ownership of intelligence and associated action.

160. While laudable, it is not clear where this system of ownership sits within the NIM framework. Principally, it is not evident how reactive action undertaken by officers, prior to submitting a log to their supervisors or the local intelligence cell, can be monitored to ensure that it accords with the area control strategy. The BVRT would underline, however, that individuals should not be completely restricted as to their submissions. There will be occasions when unique local situations arise not envisaged within the control strategy (although the strategy could be amended to account for them).
161. Likewise, action endorsed or recommended by a local supervisor cannot be similarly assessed unless that supervisor has an active role in the local tactical tasking and co-ordination process. The NIM implies that this active role falls on middle managers within the Force.³³

The Availability of Intelligence Cells

162. Policing is a twenty-four hour business but it will be noted that the facilities provided by divisional intelligence cells, and HQ FIB are mainly available during normal working hours Monday to Friday. It is a probable reality of policing Dyfed-Powys that no one BCU will be able to provide the resources of a full intelligence cell to its officers twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.
163. This situation equally applies to HQ FIB which, in strict person terms, has fewer specific intelligence resources than Carmarthenshire BCU.³⁴
164. The nature of the intelligence process requires the Force to have some kind of capability to respond to 'hot' intelligence. The key issue for Dyfed-Powys has always been one of maintaining and justifying capabilities in a, relatively, low crime environment. Intelligence capability is not just reactive but, increasingly, police forces are developing 'real-time' intelligence capability. This provides for officers en route to incidents to receive relevant intelligence before they arrive.
165. On a Divisional basis FIOs have sought to provide some degree of intelligence cover throughout the week. In Pembrokeshire, for example, the two DC FIOs would take turns to periodically provide some degree of weekend cover. However, there are simply

³³ Page 13, *who attends?*. the National Intelligence Model, NCIS, London 2000.

³⁴ HQ FIB (not counting COR) has 5.5 staff (1 Analyst, 1 DS, 1 DC, 2.5 clerical) while Carmarthenshire has 9 (3 FIO, 3 CSO, 3 LOCAL INTELLIGENCE CLERK clerk).


insufficient resources to maintain permanent cover at just a Divisional level.

- 166.** CSOs and Local Intelligence Clerks, as support staff, are generally not required to provide cover outside their contracted hours.
- 167.** With effectively ten intelligence units (including HQ FIB and the ports intelligence cell) spread across the Force, there is theoretically scope for the Force to maintain a twenty-four hour proactive intelligence cell provision. This would, however, require greater flexibility in the employment criteria of support staff and a degree of central co-ordination.
- 168.** Through Operations and control rooms officers en route to incidents can still be provided with data from Force intelligence systems even outside the usual opening hours of Intelligence Cells.
- 169.** The BVRT noted that the clerical support staff within HQ FIB are not provided with flexi-time arrangements as found in other HQ support staff roles. Support staff employed in CID roles generally work normal office hours but are required to work outside this in the event of a major incident or enquiry.
- 170.** The clerical support staff could not recall any occasion in which they had been required to work outside their contracted period. Flexi-time arrangements for these staff could increase operational flexibility while retaining a requirement to attend duty in the event of specific need. This may also enhance staff morale and increase office flexibility to respond to workload demands.
- 171.** This does need to be weighed against the critical business function that the staff perform. There is a requirement for staff to be in the intelligence officer at key times, although this can be accommodated within core-time working arrangements. The Review Head has also noted that the small size of the unit means additional potential absence would reduce the resilience of the team.

The input of intelligence logs to CIS.

172. Mainly, this task has fallen to the clerk in the intelligence cell. Logs in relation to certain crime types, such as heroin related intelligence, have previously been sent directly to HQ FIB for input. Figure 14 shows the proportion of logs input by Divisional Local Intelligence Clerks for 2000 and 2001 and 2002. The remaining logs will have been sent to HQ FIB.


Figure 14: Input of intelligence logs



173. It will be noted that, for most stations, there was a reduction in the proportion of C600b input at the local level for 2001. However, this was in contrast to the overall level of logs received in the stations as shown by figure 15 (overleaf) where significant increases in volumes have been experienced across the Force. Intelligence resources during this period have remained stable.

174. The increased levels of logs overall, coupled with the increased proportion being forwarded to HQ FIB led directly to a build up of intelligence logs there in 2002. Within a relatively short period the demand created by the influx of logs at HQ level exceeded the capacity of HQ staff to deal with them. This led to the situation where the most important types of intelligence logs were being forwarded to HQ FIB for immediate action, only to be caught up in several weeks work in hand.

Figure 15: Number of logs received at BCU stations.




- 175.** To overcome the delays in having priority information being input onto CIS by HQ FIB, some BCU intelligence cells began to input all logs of importance themselves before sending the form C600b to HQ FIB. Neither BCU intelligence cells or HQ FIB increased resources in line with the increases in the number of intelligence logs submitted.
- 176.** HQ CMRD, following discussion at Operations Conference and with the agreement of BCU Commanders, decided that the majority of intelligence logs should be input on division. Logs in relation to specific serious crime types, such as the use of crack-cocaine, are still being forwarded to HQ FIB.
- 177.** FIB staff identified that, in addition to any potential delays within HQ, that numbers of logs were late in arriving. Specific examples were noted of logs having been drafted on Division some six weeks prior to their arrival in HQ FIB³⁵.
- 178.** As an extra aspect of the intelligence submission process, inputting of logs generated at BCU level should only be conducted at Force headquarters if it is considered that doing so adds definite value to the overall process.

³⁵ Consultation with Divisional FIOs revealed that not all have actual deputies to process work in their absence. One FIO noted that several weeks of intelligence logs had been left, unactioned, in their in-tray during a period of leave. Many of these will have arrived in FIB 'late.'

- 179.** The process followed by FIB upon arrival of a C600b is shown in figure 16 (overleaf). The source of these C600b can be divisional personnel but can, also, be generated by headquarters based personnel such as the Central Detective Unit.
- 180.** Currently inputting staff in FIB create all 'nominals' or new records on CIS in respect of named individuals. The inputters read and assess the nomination and then create a record as appropriate.
- 181.** The inputters are experienced in what they do. This allows a certain degree of standardisation in the information that they input which, in turn, can facilitate data recovery or searches by individuals similarly aware. In addition, knowledge gained from inputting specific logs can also lead to the inputters making linkages between different logs and nominals.
- 182.** The potential value added by the inputters making links between divisional intelligence logs has to be set against the actual delay this further link in the intelligence process brings with it.
- 183.** The inputters also have a responsibility to input provenancing data for COR. Since the introduction of RIPA 1999, work in this area has more than doubled. The input of provenancing forms now takes up to a third of their time.

Figure 16: Process route of C600b followed in HQ FIB



184. Provenance forms, along with the intelligence logs generated by headquarters personnel (which, in the main, will be in relation to the higher level cases being pursued at this level) appear to provide sufficient workload for the HQ inputters. HQ CMRD are examining the prospect of specific administrative support for the Covert Registry. This will reduce the burden on intelligence inputters.

Area for Development	Options for Change
Reduce potential for delay in submission of C600b from BCU to HQ	<p>Option 1: Do nothing. Risk of delay and creation of backlogs remains.</p> <p>Option 2: Amend policy to have <u>all</u> divisional generated logs input by local intelligence cell and all HQ generated logs input by Force FIB.³⁶</p> <p>Option 3: Maintain a flexible policy to regularly review type of log to be dealt with at each level.</p> <p>Option 4: Employ additional administrative support for HQ COR.</p>

Recommendation 6	Employ additional administrative support for HQ COR
Financial Benefit	.None. Financial cost of administrative staff.
Other Benefits	Increased resilience in HQ COR and reduced risk of processing delays.

Search Records

185. As noted in the baseline assessment, there is considerable variation in the way in which BCU intelligence cells store and record search records (both A271 and A273 forms). Some units maintain their records based on the calendar year and others on the financial year. There is scope to standardise this process.
186. All of these records are manually collected and stored. Occasionally they can contain information that is significant to ongoing enquiries. Recovering this information generally requires a physical search and scan of all the forms relevant to a particular date or area.
187. Some forces, such as Gwent, utilise specific databases to record search records. This requires additional resources for inputting data on force systems but also more rapid extraction of relevant intelligence. A balance needs to be struck between the cost effectiveness of inputting data against overall crime levels. Such a system may be more pertinent to some parts of the Force than others.

³⁶ Except where a C600b(iii) Provenance Form is attached.

Area for Development	Options for Change
Standardise intelligence cell record keeping.	<p>Option 1: Do nothing.</p> <p>Option 2: Have all intelligence cells collate information in line with the calendar year. This will be out of sequence with business planning.</p> <p>Option 3: Have all intelligence cells collate information in line with the financial year.</p>

Recommendation 7	All Intelligence Cells to collate information in line with the financial year.
Financial Benefit	None noted.
Other Benefits	Slight efficiency savings in data collation and improved effectiveness in comparison of data.

Area for Development	Options for Change
Provide electronic retrieval of data held on search records.	<p>Option 1: Do nothing. Retrieval of intelligence from search records is done manually.</p> <p>Option 2: Evaluate the effectiveness of electronic storage of search records, such as in Gwent, and consider for implementation in Dyfed-Powys.</p> <p>Option 3: Develop an in-Force database for the recording and collation of search records.</p>

Recommendation 8	Evaluate the effectiveness of electronic storage of search records and consider for implementation in Dyfed-Powys.
Financial Benefit	None noted. Probable cost in establishment of database.
Other Benefits	Improved effectiveness through potential to use search records for intelligence purposes.

Additional Intelligence Sources

- 188.** Additional intelligence information can be found from a variety of sources. Not all of these, however, are available to all officers or indeed available to key analytical staff. Examples of this include records of domestic violence and the Sex Offenders or At Risk Register. Partner agencies can also hold information that can be of use in intelligence terms and in certain circumstances.
- 189.** While it is important that protocols exist on data sharing, and that only appropriate personnel have access to particular information, there may remain scope to further facilitate general access to electronic intelligence sources (see Recommendation 4).

NOTES

Processing and Evaluation

- 190.** Evaluation is the process by which the credibility of the information collected is assessed. Across United Kingdom police forces the recognised system of evaluation is known as the 5x5x5 method. This is a system to determine the quality of the source of the information as the information itself.
- 191.** The following principles should apply to the evaluation of intelligence:
- ✓ Evaluation must not be influenced by personal feelings but based on professional judgement,
 - ✓ Evaluation of the source must be made separately to the information provided,
 - ✓ Information must not be recorded or disseminated without a decision being made as to who can access it.
- 192.** Evaluation of the source of the information, that is the person providing it, is graded on a scale of A to E. This ranges from a reliable or trusted source through to an untested source that may lack trustworthiness or competence.
- 193.** The information itself is also graded on a five-point scale but this ranges from 1 to 5. 1 is assigned where the information is known to be true whereas 5 is assigned where information is considered false or malicious.
- 194.** A handling code, ranging from 1 to 5, is also assigned. This dictates the level to which the information may, or may not, be spread across the Force and partner agencies.
- 195.** In addition to providing the raw intelligence, it is up to the submitting officer to evaluate the reliability of the intelligence source, the information provided and whom the information may be passed to. Figure 17-19 shows the confidence of officers in the various evaluations required of them.

Figure 17: Confidence at evaluating sources.




Figure 18: Confidence at evaluating intelligence provided.






Figure 19: Confidence at identifying a handling code.



196. These results would suggest that officers are correctly evaluating their intelligence sources and the intelligence they receive. Ability to correctly identify a handling code is less. Levels of confidence rise with rank.

197. The BVRT also asked supervisors for their views about the capabilities of their team members. Supervisors are required to assess the intelligence logs submitted by their team members. It is apparent from figure 20 that supervisors are less confident about the abilities of their team members than their team members are.
198. Consultation with staff in the intelligence cells also suggested that officers, prior to submission, were not correctly completing a significant proportion of intelligence logs.

Figure 20: Supervisor perceptions of the confidence of their team members.



199. This would suggest that there is scope to improve the overall capabilities of officers to correctly assess the information they provide.


Area for Development	Options for Change
Extend awareness of correct evaluation of intelligence material.	<p>Option 1: Do nothing. Risk a proportion of intelligence continues to be incorrectly assessed.</p> <p>Option 2: Provide all officers with a personal aide memoire in respect of intelligence evaluation.</p> <p>Option 3: Issue a reminder of correct procedure in routine orders.</p> <p>Option 4: Have DTOs run refresher training for all operational staff.</p> <p>Option 5: Any combination of options 2,3 and 4.</p> <p>Option 6: Remove the requirement for operational officers to conduct the assessment in isolation.</p>

Recommendation 9	DTOs run refresher training for all operational staff in line with PDRS
Financial Benefit	Opportunity costs.
Other Benefits	Improved awareness of intelligence procedures leading to increased procedural effectiveness and efficiency.

Provenancing


- 200.** Where the source of the intelligence is to be protected, because of its nature, or subject of an application for Public Interest Immunity, an additional form is submitted with the intelligence log. This additional form is the C600b (iii) Provenance Form. It basically outlines the reasons why the source has to be protected. Such forms are dealt with specifically by HQ COR.
- 201.** The guidance and legislation in relation to this area is relatively complex. Intelligence staff, both at HQ and BCU levels, have indicated that many officers are unfamiliar with how to correctly assess and complete the C600b(iii).
- 202.** Figure 21 provides a breakdown of responses provided to the BVRT by Constables and supervisors on the issue of provenance. As is apparent, the majority of officers consider themselves to be confident with the subject.

Figure 21: Officer confidence with the subject of provenance.



- 203.** The BVRT also asked supervisors to judge the relative confidence of members of their team. Figure 22 indicates that supervisors have a fairly clear idea of their team's awareness in these areas.

Figure 22: Supervisor perceptions of team member confidence in relation to provenance.



204. The evidence suggests that around four fifths of officers have confidence in correctly assessing provenance.

Area for Development	Options for Change
Extend awareness of correct provenancing	<p>Option 1: Do nothing. Risk a proportion of officers continuing to lack confidence in assessing provenance.</p> <p>Option 2: Provide all officers with a personal aide memoire in respect of provenance.</p> <p>Option 3: Issue a reminder of correct procedure in routine orders.</p> <p>Option 4: Have DTOs run refresher training for all operational staff.</p> <p>Option 5: Any combination of options 2,3 and 4.</p>

Recommendation 10	DTOs run refresher training for all operational staff
Financial Benefit	Opportunity costs.
Other Benefits	Improved awareness of intelligence procedures leading to increased procedural effectiveness and efficiency.

The Role of Field Intelligence Officers

- 205.** Responsibility for cultivating and handling Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS) is part of the job specification for divisional Field Intelligence Officers. This reflects their close ties with the local pro-active teams and their regular participation in local operations.
- 206.** The views of individual FIOs were mixed in respect of whether their duties, away from the intelligence cell, were useful and of value to their role. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the majority of contact and development of CHIS is conducted by officers in the pro-active teams rather than the FIOs.
- 207.** During the activity analysis exercise conducted by the BVRT, none of the FIOs returned a record of involvement with informants.
- 208.** Table 2 provides a breakdown of the role of FIOs in intelligence cells from BCU family 12. Two of the areas noted employ a separate source handling unit to deal with this area of covert policing. The reason for this is to provide a 'sterile' corridor between information obtained from sources and the action taken on that information.
- 209.** This highlights that some forces perceive a potential conflict of interest in the duties of FIOs, in relation to the intelligence products they provide or contribute to and the informants they could cultivate.

Table 2

Basic Command Unit	FIOs include informant duties?	No. of officers dedicated to informant duties
Carlisle and Penrith	No	Separate source handling unit: One DS, Four DCs
Carmarthenshire	Yes	N/a
Ceredigion	Yes	N/a
Powys	Yes	N/a
Pembrokeshire	Yes	N/a
Western North Wales	Not known	Not known
North Northumberland	Yes	A Support Clerk deals with RIPA work
South-West Northumberland	Yes	A Crime Manager deals with informant handling
Hereford	No	Separate source handling unit: One DS, Two DCs

- 210.** HQ CMRD have disputed that this is an issue. The role of the FIO is to facilitate the gathering of intelligence but not to personally take action on it. Involvement with informants is part of the FIO job description.

Analysis and Production

- 211.** The traditional approach to law enforcement – street investigation, informants and covert operations – has a primary focus on the collection of information. Analysis takes collected and evaluated information and organises and interprets it in a way to add value that increases the possibility of prosecuting or preventing crime. Force managers and policy makers rely on intelligence products prepared and analysed in the wake of the collection and evaluation phases.
- 212.** Analysis is the hub of the intelligence process where the conversion of basic information into finished intelligence products occurs. These intelligence products may be presented as briefings, situation reports recommendations or long-term assessments.
- 213.** The NIM has identified no less than nine separate forms of analysis discipline:
- ✓ Results Analysis – assessing the impact of policing activity such as patrol strategies and pro-active investigations.
 - ✓ Crime Pattern Analysis - identifying links between crimes and other forms of offending.
 - ✓ Market Profiles – assessing criminal commodity markets, such as drugs, to identify trends and activities.
 - ✓ Demographic/Social Trend Analysis – Identifying and predicting emerging social issues such as the impact of new housing estates on the local demand for policing.
 - ✓ Criminal Business Profile – Examination of the way in which criminal operations work to identify counter-activities.
 - ✓ Network Analysis – Examining the communication and financial links between criminals.
 - ✓ Risk Analysis – To assess the risks posed by specific individuals or criminal groups.
 - ✓ Target Profile Analysis – Providing a detailed picture of specific criminals, such as habits and associates, to identify the best way to combat them.
 - ✓ Operational Intelligence Assessment – Ensuring policing activities continue to conform to objectives agreed through the tasking and co-ordination process.
- Not all of these will be applied at the same time although a combination could be brought to bear on particular issues. One implication of this range of disciplines may be to suggest that the role of the analyst is a fairly specialist one.

- 214.** There are two broad and overlapping forms of analysis: **tactical** or operational analysis and **strategic** analysis³⁷. Both forms of analysis do not compete but, instead, compliment each other at differing levels within the organisation.
- 215.** Tactical analysis is primarily used as an investigative tool, supporting operational officers during the course of a particular investigation or initiative. Generally targeted at short-term objectives, tactical analysis is focussed on achieving immediate outcomes such as arrests. Its direct application to active operations can enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of available police resources by providing direction and links between enquiries.
- 216.** Strategic analysis is mainly a management tool assisting in policy development. It is used to provide an overview of the scope and size of criminal activity that, in turn, underpins the development of strategic planning to produce counteractive options. Strategic analysis allows for the initiation of action plans that operate on longer terms against emerging trends in crime and criminal behaviour. Strategic analysis, because it is geared to assess the '*bigger picture*' can allow a certain amount of predictive forecasting.

Analysts in Dyfed-Powys

- 217.** Currently the Force employs three full-time dedicated analysts³⁸, or one analyst for around every 400 officers. Two of these have roles purely related to the intelligence process. These are the Force Analyst, based with the CMRD at Force Headquarters, and a Crime Analyst attached to the Ports Unit based in Fishguard port. The third Analyst in Dyfed-Powys is employed to provide DNA profiling analysis.
- 218.** Best Practice forces, as originally stated by the NIM Implementation Team³⁹, generally have around one analyst per every 100 officers. Based on this premise, Dyfed-Powys should actually be employing some 12 dedicated crime analysts. However, this ratio of analysts to officers makes no account of actual crime levels and the NIM implementation team have since retracted their original ratio.

Force Analysts

- 219.** Currently, as noted, there are two headquarters based analysts providing a service to the rest of the Force (the Force Analyst and

³⁷ Intelligence Led Policing and the Key Role of Criminal Intelligence Analysis: Preparing for the 21st Century, R.C. Fahlman, www.interpol.int/public/cia/fahlman.asp.

³⁸ The Force also employs ten 'research-analysts' in Corporate Services.

³⁹ Text of BVRT interview with NIM implementation team but also confirmed by other forces contacted by the BVRT and visited by the NIM Implementation Team. The ratio of one analyst per 100 officers does not appear in any official NIM documentation.

the CMRD based DNA Analyst). In direct terms of Crime Management and Reduction, it is the Force Analyst that is responsible for providing key intelligence products in line with the NIM.

- 220.** The stated job purpose of the Force Principal Analyst is:
“to lead in the strategic and tactical analysis of intelligence and crime trends to assist in the detection of crime within the Force⁴⁰.”
- 221.** In interview, the previous Force Analyst indicated that the bulk of their role had been that of a tactical analyst, operating effectively in a crime support role, with occasional demands of a more strategic nature. These additional demands included some extra-force work such as maintaining a database and conducting analysis on distraction burglaries for the region.
- 222.** Following discussion with the previous Force Analyst, the BVRT did not conduct an activity analysis of their work. However, they did complete a perceptual survey in relation to their work. They considered that half of their time was spent working on Level One intelligence issues with around 30% and 20% spent on Level Two and Three respectively.
- 223.** The BVRT understand that the current Force analysts is primarily engaged in conducting higher level (i.e. levels two and three) intelligence matters.
- 224.** The key products produced by the Analyst were, with frequency:
- ✓ Intelligence Bulletins (internal & external) – *“as and when.”*
 - ✓ Target packages – *“as and when”,*
 - ✓ CPA reports – *“as and when,”*
 - ✓ Reports to ACPO – monthly,
 - ✓ Reports to RISG – monthly.
- 225.** These products were, in the main, produced on demand “as and when” required. In strict terms, only two of the nine analytical disciplines is represented and only one of the four key intelligence products.
- 226.** In 2001, in order to meet a central demand to produce a strategic intelligence assessment for the whole of the Force, CMRD tasked Corporate Services to help produce the document in collaboration with the existing Force Analyst and the CMRD Det. Supt. Partially this was due to the impending retirement of the existing analyst, but it was also brought about by the realisation that the strategic intelligence assessment is a very different type of product to the

⁴⁰ Source: Routine Orders, job advert for Force Principal Analyst.

tactical analysis then forming most of the work. As such, a different viewpoint and a different set of skills were required.

- 227.** The BVRT examined similar forces to identify the actual analytical capability available at the Force level.

Table 3: HQ Intelligence Capability

Force	Headquarters Intelligence Analytical Capability
Derbyshire	One Senior Analyst Three Intelligence Analysts
Devon & Cornwall	One Analyst Manager One Strategic Analyst One Tactical Drugs Intelligence Analyst One Drugs Intelligence Analyst Two Researchers
Durham	Three Analysts Three Researchers
Dyfed-Powys	One Force Analyst
Norfolk	One Analyst
North Wales	Three Crime Analysts


Divisional Analysts

- 228.** In strict terms, the Force does not have any divisional analysts. Dyfed-Powys has, at a divisional level, relied upon the Crime Support Officers (CSO) based within local intelligence cells to provide much of the intelligence analysis required by the Force. However, intelligence analysis originally formed only one aspect of their overall job function.
- 229.** The original stated purpose of the CSO role was *“to provide efficient support to Divisional Detective Inspectors and their staff, advise Senior Management and assist in the development and implementation of operational strategies to effectively reduce crime within the Force.”* Intelligence analysis, in any form as part of their function, only occurred at point eight out of a nine-point job description.
- 230.** The only stated analytical discipline for CSOs, of the nine possible, was the conduct of Crime Pattern Analysis was to ensure the early identification of crime trends, patterns and offenders.
- 231.** Recent revision of the Divisional CSO Job Description has placed greater emphasis on the analytical role of the CSO.⁴¹ Indeed, their stated purpose is *“to identify and analyse patterns of crime and to prepare crime pattern analysis/ intelligence packages on problem areas and target criminals.”*

⁴¹ A full text of the revised job description can be found at Appendix B. Divisional CSOs are currently Scale 4 but are subject to a Job Evaluation Exercise, the results of which were not available to the BVRT.

- 232.** In addition to this specialist capability, CSOs are also called upon to undertake a range of general administrative tasks in support of local Detective Inspectors.
- 233.** The BVRT examined the main uses managers were making of local intelligence cells. Figure 23 (below) shows the proportion of managers who use the CSOs for specific purposes. As can be seen, the main tasks requested are analytical in nature. This suggests the primary activities of CSOs, and those areas of greater operational need, are specialist intelligence functions rather than the additional administrative tasks.

Figure 23: proportion of supervisors using CSOs for specific tasks



- 234.** The following table (overleaf) provides a breakdown of analytical and crime management roles within the other divisions in our BCU family. As can be seen, all other similar BCUs operate with at least twice the number of staff employed in these roles. All of them also employ specific and dedicated analysts at this divisional level.⁴²

⁴² It may be argued that the Forces compared with will have lower crime levels and therefore lower need for local intelligence capability. Appendix D provides a breakdown of crime levels in BCU family 12 that show this argument is not wholly a valid one.

Table 4: BCU Analytical Capability

Basic Command Unit	Analytical and Crime Management Staff per BCU			
	Crime Analysts	Researchers	Crime Support Officers	Other
Carlisle and Penrith	1	1	0	0
Carmarthenshire	0	0	3	3
Ceredigion	0	0	1	1
Powys	0	0	2	2
Pembrokeshire	0	0	2	2
Western North Wales	3		1	2
North Northumberland	1	1	1	0
South-West Northumberland	1		1	0
Hereford	3	1	2	0

235. Examination of the number of officers in these BCUs, against the original NIM ratio of one analyst per 100 officers provides results as given in the following figure.

Table 5: NIM Analytical Ratio

Basic Command Unit	Officers	NIM ratio (Suggested Analysts)	Actual Analysts
Carlisle and Penrith	311.8	3.12	1
Carmarthenshire	333.7	3.33	0
Ceredigion	150.8	1.50	0
Powys	233.6	2.33	0
Pembrokeshire	253.6	2.53	0
Western North Wales	345.0	3.45	3
North Northumberland	121.0	1.21	1
South-West Northumberland	116.0	1.16	1
Hereford	252.7	2.53	3

236. Four of the assessed BCUs possess levels of analysts near to or in excess of the good practice ratio highlighted by the NIM Implementation team. As noted previously, this ratio does not take into consideration local crime rates. The BVRT examined the BCUs more closely to identify more accurate correlations for comparison⁴³.

237. As our smallest BCU (in terms of population, officers and crime levels) Ceredigion was taken as a baseline level. The overall statistics for Ceredigion correlate fairly closely with both the

⁴³ See Appendix D

Northumbrian BCUs. This may suggest that the analytical establishment in Ceredigion should match those two BCUs, creating a need in Ceredigion for a dedicated crime analyst.

- 238.** Developing this approach further would suggest an operational requirement for two dedicated analysts each in Pembrokeshire and Powys and three dedicated analysts in Carmarthenshire. This requirement presupposes, however, that there is sufficient analytical work, which needs to be conducted, to justify these positions.
- 239.** Activity analysis suggested that less than a fifth of CSO time was taken up by analytical work. This analysis exercise was undertaken in February and March 2002. Since then, the Force CMRD has been undertaking an independent assessment to the degree with which the Force has implemented the NIM. There is significant indication that at the time of analysis CSOs were not undertaking the full range of analytical techniques and products required by the NIM.
- 240.** A perceptual survey, conducted in January at the beginning of the review, identified that the primary analytical procedure conducted by CSOs was Crime Pattern Analysis (CPA). Other than contributions to target packages CSOs conducted little other analysis work. At the time, the Force had obtained NIM funding to purchase I₂ software but practical awareness and use of it was limited by difficulties in assimilating the software.
- 241.** This general situation was confirmed by direct interviews of CSOs. Although all very professional and dedicated to their role, there was limited evidence of analytical work beyond CPA, contribution to target packages and providing historic management information. The CSOs referred to their overall workloads, lack of time and the limits of training and information technology resources.
- 242.** Headquarters CMRD has also indicated that the analytical work needs to be refined within divisions in order to conform to the NIM.⁴⁴ It has been stated that CSOs would be required to begin to develop problem and tactical profiling in line with centrally agreed formats. Such analysis had been undertaken separately but under a different name.
- 243.** Overall, these circumstances would suggest that there is a shortfall in analytical capacity at a divisional level. The comparison with similar BCUs would appear to confirm this but has not been extended to also assess the effectiveness of actual capability.

⁴⁴ E.g. Minutes of Operations Conference 15 August 2002.

244. Attention should be drawn to HMIC guidance and their BCU inspection protocol in relation to implementation of the NIM at BCU level. That protocol records that BCU-level intelligence activity requires:
- ✓ *Dedicated* analytical and intelligence resources, to produce the intelligence products such as target and problem profiles.
245. Crime Support Officers provide a degree of analytical capability but must do so within a context of other duties as well. Figure 15 identified the significant increases in the volume of intelligence material that must be assessed and analysed.
246. Clearly, BCU commanders must assess their own intelligence requirements, in relation to local crime levels, and the level of analytical capability they require. Funding to meet any anticipated increased cost of providing analytical capacity could come from four potential sources:
- ✓ Force central budget,
 - ✓ CMRD budget,
 - ✓ BCU budget,
 - ✓ NIM Implementation funding.

Scientific Support Analysis

247. The process for collecting information for intelligence purposes is fairly standard across the Force as far as the set up of intelligence cells, tasking and co-ordination and HQ FIB is concerned.
248. Information collected by Scenes of Crime Officers (SOCO), that is evidence such as DNA, fingerprints and footprints, is generally subject to specialist analysis. Where evidence of this type results in an identification of an offender, this result is fed back to divisional Detective Inspectors to ensure work is undertaken and published on the Force Intranety
249. Information and identification gathered in this way is clearly an analytical product. Material can also contribute to target and problem profiles. As such there is a clear framework within which the work of the Scientific Support Unit can be incorporated within the processes of the NIM.

Area for Development	Options for Change
Integrate SSU processes with the NIM processes	Option 1: Do nothing. Option 2: Formalise the use of the Force DNA Analyst in a capacity, with Tasking and Co-ordination, the same as the Force Intelligence Analyst.


Recommendation 11	Formalise the use of the Force DNA Analyst in a capacity, with Tasking and Co-ordination, the same as the Force Intelligence Analyst.
Financial Benefit	None noted
Other Benefits	Potential efficiency and effectiveness savings

Notes

Dissemination


- 250.** Dependent upon the nature of the intelligence gathered and analysed, resultant information is then distributed. This can be spread within a section or division, or spread across the Force or even to other forces and organisations.
- 251.** The core intention is to pass intelligence gained to those who need to, and are able to, act upon it. It is not the practice of circulating everything to everyone.
- 252.** The information to be distributed should include, where appropriate, intelligence products generated by intelligence personnel.
- 253.** Some of the most common means used to pass intelligence across the Force have included:
- ✓ Verbal briefing,
 - ✓ Daily intranet bulletins,
 - ✓ Briefing sheets
 - ✓ Force and BCU bulletins and
 - ✓ Intelligence Cell Intranet Pages.
- 254.** The BVRT tested officer opinion regarding the relative effectiveness of these methods. Figure 24 shows the views of constables. Traditional briefing methods are considered as more effective than briefing or information provided via the Force Intranet.

Figure 24: Constables' views of the effectiveness of existing dissemination methods.



255. The views of supervisors were also sought and their responses are shown in figure 25. As with constables, it is the verbal and paper based briefing methods that are considered to be more effective.

Figure 25: Supervisors view of the effectiveness of dissemination methods.



256. Each of the divisional intelligence cells compile and distribute briefing sheets. These are, effectively, updates of incidents with some intelligence also provided. Ideally the briefing sheets are personally presented to operational teams at the beginning of a shift or tour of duty by the local FIO. However, the duty sergeant generally provides the briefing.

257. The briefing sheets are also published on the local intelligence cell's Intranet site with the intention that any officer, regardless of their shift, can access the information and be aware of the current local situation.

258. Intranet based briefing does allow for more information to be available and disseminated than manual methods. However, it does require that an officer be logged onto a computer system. This effectively also requires that the officer be inside a police station.

259. A number of forces, for example Bedfordshire, have experimented with providing briefing for officers via the use of PowerPoint presentations on wide-screen televisions. There are benefits to the use of Information and Communications Technology in this fashion. Briefings can hold the attention more and information, presented graphically, can be more readily assimilated. Self-briefing also becomes more active and informative.

- 260.** The quality of briefing across the Force, as in most organisations, has been identified as variable by a number of reviews. Bulletins, the bulk of a briefing, need to be concise, accurate and informative. The method of delivery will vary across the Force, dependent upon such factors as whether the officers being briefed are part of a shift at a town station or are self-briefing at a rural out-station.
- 261.** Cerdigion BCU have developed a briefing template, Centrex Approved, that seeks to address some of these issues.
- 262.** Regardless of the method of delivery, there is considerable scope to standardise the format of bulletins and briefings. In particular, there is opportunity to demonstrate and realise the links between local operational activities to higher section, BCU, Force, Police Authority and Ministerial priorities through the use of templated formats.
- 263.** As with written briefing products, the development of intranet based intelligence provision has been sporadic and variable. This has generally been compounded by an absence of training, for intelligence cell staff, in how to fully utilise intranet technology.
- 264.** Interested individuals have traditionally conducted the development of divisional intranet sites as an addition to their personal duties. Intelligence cells have had to obtain assistance from such individuals or else develop their own sites by trial and error.
- 265.** The provision of appropriate training to allow staff in intelligence cells to fully use available computer resources has been, at best, slow. Indeed, some managers have circumvented HQ Development Services entirely and sent staff on courses with local colleges.
- 266.** This has ensured that some staff have the relevant training but has also meant that no two intelligence sites, even within a single BCU, are the same. The variation in formats creates its own difficulties for officers trying to rapidly locate relevant information.
- 267.** The Force has recently employed a specific web-developer with the intention of upgrading the way in which information is provided over its Internet Site. A number of HQ departments have already used this individual to upgrade local Intranet sites.
- 268.** There is opportunity for the Force to use this individual to provide training to intelligence cell staff and, by doing so, to develop and provide an standard corporate framework for the presentation of intelligence data on the Intranet. This format could be linked to the development of briefing packages proposed elsewhere.

Area for Development	Options for Change
Improve intelligence intranet site to a corporate standard.	<p>Option 1: Do nothing. Quality of intelligence sites across the Force remains variable with inconsistent content.</p> <p>Option 2: Develop a standard corporate framework for provision of intelligence information via the intranet.</p> <p>Option 3: Provide central training in Intranet site production and development to a standard framework.</p>

Recommendation 12	Develop a corporate approach to intelligence provision, via the intranet, as part of a corporate briefing model.
Financial Benefit	Opportunity costs.
Other Benefits	Potential efficiency and effectiveness savings through improved provision of, and ease of access to, intelligence information

Management Structures and Communications

- 269.** Within the Force, management of FIB is assigned to a Detective Inspector who also has responsibility for Force Special Branch.
- 270.** The NIM Implementation Team have, however, highlighted that good practice is for the officer in charge of intelligence units to be a dedicated Inspector⁴⁵.
- 271.** NCIS guidance on the setting up and running of intelligence units requires that the manager of an intelligence unit needs to be of appropriate status to ensure meaning and significance are provided to completed intelligence products⁴⁶. That the post has to be filled by a police officer is not specified.
- 272.** Clearly there are two levels at which units will be managed within the Force. They are, at Force HQ level and at Divisional level.
- 273.** NIM guidance stipulates that a properly functioning intelligence unit requires 8 key staff roles, some of which can be combined. These are:
- ✓ Intelligence Manager,
 - ✓ Informant Controller,
 - ✓ Team Supervision,
 - ✓ Data Management,
 - ✓ Briefing,
 - ✓ Field Capability,
 - ✓ Analytical Capability and
 - ✓ Crime Reduction.
- 274.** The provision of all of these roles, with the exception of management and supervisor, could be directly obtained by the philosophical merging of Intelligence Cells, Pro-active teams and Community Safety Officers.
- 275.** Within Force HQ all of these units fall within a single department, CMRD. At BCU level, Divisional DIs have management responsibility for their local pro-active teams and intelligence cell. Some also have responsibility for Divisional Community Safety Officers but, as indicated by the Best Value Review of Community Safety, this is more of a responsibility in theory than in actuality. It also varies by division.

⁴⁵ Correspondence NCIS to HQ CMRD 05.06.02.

⁴⁶ The National Intelligence Model, NCIS 2000 (Page 21).

276. The BVRT examined management roles in comparative BCUs. DIs exclusively fulfil an overall management role. Except in Dyfed-Powys, the management structure for intelligence cells is identical to pro-active teams. This is shown in table 6.

Table 6: Intelligence supervisors

Basic Command Unit	Intelligence cell Supervisor	Pro-active Team Supervisor	Overall Supervisor
Carlisle and Penrith	DS	DS	Not known
Carmarthenshire	Report to DI	DS	DI
Ceredigion	Report to DI	DS	DI
Powys	Report to DI	DS	DI
Pembrokeshire	Report to DI	DS	DI
Western North Wales	DS	DS	DI
North Northumberland	DS	DS	DI
South-West Northumberland	Report to DI	Report to DI	DI
Hereford	DS	DS	DI

277. Consideration could be given to appointing Sergeants as intelligence cell supervisors. This would put the supervision of the unit on a par with local pro-active teams, raise the profile of intelligence cells and, perhaps, ensure balance in the nature and role of tasks undertaken by intelligence cells.

278. Supervision in Headquarters FIB was also examined by the BVRT. Table 7 provides a breakdown of supervisory roles in similar Forces.

Table 7: Intelligence supervisors by Force

Force	FIB Manager	Overall Intelligence Manager (if different)
Derbyshire	SO1 Support Staff	DCI
Devon & Cornwall	DI	DCI
Durham	DCI	DSupt
Dyfed-Powys	DI	DCI
Norfolk	DS	DI
North Wales	DI	DSupt

279. This comparison indicates the majority of intelligence cells are managed by police officers but that there may be scope for supervision to be provided by support staff. In Dyfed-Powys supervisory responsibility within FIB was previously split with the Force Analyst managing Support Staff and the unit DS managing the police staff. Currently the unit DS manages all the FIB staff.

- 280.** Many tasks within the unit are administrative in nature and require no specific police powers. However, many functions of the work are sensitive and can require specialist police knowledge and/or experience. The matrix, overleaf, provides a framework to help assess whether management of FIB is required to be conducted by a police officer.

Point	Criterion	Critical Consideration	Yes/No	Risk Assessment (Likelihood/Impact)	Comments
1	Police Powers	Does the post require special powers (such as power of arrest, detention under Mental Health Act, PACE stop and search)?	No	Low/Low	No specific need to employ police powers
2	Industrial Action	Would industrial action taken by the post holder significantly affect operational performance or could duties be covered at short notice by a police officer?	Yes	Low/Medium	The role provides a specialist function for the Force.
3	Career Development	Is the post desirable or suitable for police career development?	Yes	Medium/Medium	The post provides an insight into a specialist area of policing
4	Sickness	Could the post be covered at short notice by police officers in the event of extended sickness? Could officers on light duties or recovering from sickness cover the post?	No	Low/Medium	Specialist knowledge is required that would take time to acquire
5	Cost Effectiveness	Is the post cheaper as a civilianised post?	Yes	High/Medium	Comparison with other forces suggests post could be £20-25,000 cheaper.
6	Additional Training	Would a support staff member require additional training that would not be required by a police officer?	No	Low/low	Training for the role would be the same for police as support staff. Appropriate qualified support staff may bring enhanced analytical skills.
7	Customer Expectation/Perception (Internal)	Is the post one where internal staff (police/support) consider that a police officer should be the post holder for reasons such as rank, trust, knowledge?	Yes	High/Medium	Post requires liaison with Divisional officers and authority to manage intelligence processes

Point	Criterion	Critical Consideration	Yes/No	Risk Assessment (Likelihood/Impact)	Comments
8	Customer Expectation/Perception (External)	Is the post one where members of the public or other agencies consider that a police officer should be the post holder?	No	Low/Low	The post is not in the public eye.
9	Requirement for additional supervision.	Will civilianisation of the post necessitate additional supervision?	Yes	High/High	DI authorisation is required for a range of intelligence issues.
10	Flexibility of Deployment by Police Officers	Is the nature of the post such that a police officer could occasionally be deployed to other policing duties.	Yes	Low/Medium	Post is specialist with a fairly constant demand from BCUs for service.
11	Command Resilience	Is the post holder required to perform duties as part of the Operational command team.	Yes	Low/Low	Holmes Office Manager

Area for Development	Options for Change
Move Detective Inspector to Operational Policing	Option 1: Do nothing. Option 2: Replace FIB DI Manager with a civilian SO1 Manager.

Recommendation 13	Retain DI as FIB manager.
Financial Benefit	None noted
Other Benefits	Continuity of knowledge. Policing command resilience and authorisation requirements.

- 281.** The FIB DI also, at a regional level, has involvement in Operation Tarian as well as the regional database on Distraction Burglaries. Some forces have senior officers dedicated to performing these regional liaison roles.
- 282.** There are three Detective Chief Inspectors operating within HQ CMRD. One of these officers has responsibility, amongst their portfolio, for the Force Intelligence Bureau.
- 283.** The DSupt CMRD maintains an active involvement in intelligence matters has been the main point of contact between the Force and other agencies, specifically the NCIS NIM Implementation Team and chairs the Regional Intelligence Sub-Group. The DSupt CMRD has operational responsibility that includes intelligence as a key factor.
- 284.** The Chief Officer (Operations) is the nominated Force Director of Intelligence.
- 285.** Also, under the NIM, the role of Intelligence Manager is to ensure the feasibility of choices, from the tactical menu, are clear to decision makers in the Force Tasking and Coordination Group.
- 286.** Currently, as evidenced by the Police Almanac and internal documentation, it is not apparent that the Force has a nominated Force Intelligence Manager although this role is performed by the DI FIB.

Drugs Intelligence

- 287.** Drugs intelligence has provided the bulk of logs to be input at HQ FIB. CMRD policy that HQ FIB should process all heroin logs was a direct factor in the build-up of unprocessed logs experienced there earlier in 2002. This policy has been changed and is subject to regular review in order to prevent such a situation rearing.

- 288.** Force FIB has a range of responsibilities in relation to drugs intelligence. This includes central provision of a liaison point for the pharmaceutical industry, monitoring of the illicit use of pre-cursor chemicals and coordinating the Force Chemist Visit database.
- 289.** HQ FIB does not currently provide a trained liaison point although the role is performed in the Force Drug Prevention Unit (DPU). The Community Safety BVR has identified the potential to release an officer from DPU for other activities.

Area for Development	Options for Change
Enhance Industrial and Pharmaceutical Drug capabilities in FIB	<p>Option 1: Do nothing.</p> <p>Option 2: Train existing FIB personnel in the role.</p> <p>Option 3: Provide additional officer in FIB to assume role with other duties.</p> <p>Option 4: Move responsibility and police post from DPU to FIB.</p>

Recommendation 14	Move responsibility and police post from DPU to FIB.
Financial Benefit	None noted.
Other Benefits	Potential efficiency and effectiveness savings

Roads Policing Intelligence

- 290.** The Sergeant within the Operations Department Accident Prevention Unit currently acts as Force coordinator for roads policing intelligence. This forms a very minor part of the officer's time, their main duties revolving around collision investigation and traffic management. The officer also has had no specific training in relation to intelligence matters or the NIM specifically.
- 291.** The Force Roads Policing Unit, within Operations Department, maintains an intranet page dedicated to roads policing intelligence (last updated in September 2001).
- 292.** There has been limited direct liaison between FIB and the Accident Prevention Unit in relation to roads policing intelligence. Vehicles do have close links to crime, either through use by criminals or by direct theft or other autocrime.
- 293.** A number of forces, for example North Wales, operate dedicated roads policing intelligence officers.
- 294.** The Home Office has already provided support for all forces to use Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) with £4.65 million pounds worth of funding from the Crime Reduction Programme. Entitled Project Spectrum this provided each force in England and Wales with one fully compatible mobile ANPR unit and associated back-office facility. In addition many forces have purchased additional ANPR capability.

295. As a Force, travelling criminals are regarded as a key source of concern. Effective intelligence in this area is critical.

Area for Development	Options for Change
Link Roads Policing Intelligence to HQ FIB	<p>Option 1: Do nothing. There is a risk relevant intelligence is viewed in a narrow manner and not shared.</p> <p>Option 2: Provide additional officer in FIB to assume role and other duties.</p> <p>Option 3: Move responsibility to existing FIB staff.</p> <p>Option 4: Create dedicated roads policing intelligence post in Operations Department.</p> <p>Option 5: Administer the roads policing intelligence site as part of an FIB site, providing a single point of intelligence.</p> <p>Option 6: Combine option 5 with any of options 1 to 4.</p> <p>Option 7: Use Project Spectrum post to administer results of ANPR within Roads Policing Intelligence.</p>

Recommendation 15	Project Spectrum post to administer results of ANPR within Roads Policing Intelligence as a post within FIB
Financial Benefit	None. Cost of police post.
Other Benefits	Improved intelligence information on travelling criminals.

296. ANPR allows for the rapid scanning and identification of individual vehicles in large traffic flows. A number of vehicles have been fitted with this system and used throughout the Force, and in joint operations with other agencies.

297. An intercept unit, tasked to stop identified offenders, usually accompanies deployed ANPR units. ANPR, however, also has significant potential as an observational tool for intelligence purposes. Its use can compliment existing covert policing methods particularly where there is a need to monitor the movement of specific vehicles.

298. It is important that operational managers are aware of the potential use of ANPR and appropriate tasking and coordination processes govern the deployment of suitably equipped vehicles. Project Spectrum does feature as a regular item in Operation Conference.

The Location of Intelligence Cells

- 299.** It has been noted that the current location of intelligence cells may reflect an earlier 8-Division organisation of the Force. The cells are based in the key towns of Aberystwyth, Haverfordwest, Pembroke Dock, Carmarthen, Llanelli, Ammanford, Brecon and Newtown. The location of a number of these cells is arguably dictated by geographical necessity. A balance has to be struck between providing close support for operational officers and the advantages that economies of scale can bring.
- 300.** Operational officers carried out a review of facilities in Carmarthenshire BCU in July 2001. Consultation with the officer in charge of that review suggested that there may be potential to reduce the number of intelligence cells in the Carmarthenshire from 3 to 2 with the closure of the Ammanford cell and the redeployment of its personnel to the Carmarthen and Llanelli cells. This was rejected by Divisional Management based on a practical assessment of local needs.
- 301.** Other than suggesting the intelligence units should be dedicated units, the NCIS NIM guidance contains no specific direction on what level they should be operating at. There is, however, an implication that a single unit will be operating at BCU level.
- 302.** The NIM does describe each intelligence unit operating within a level set at that of its own local intelligence requirement. For many forces this requirement will be at BCU level but, for others, geographical and crime level factors will be the major influences.
- 303.** The BVRT examined other BCUs in BCU Family 12 to establish the number of intelligence cells in each one. This may provide an indication of the actual impact of these other influences.

Table 8: Intelligence cells by BCU

Basic Command Unit	Number of intelligence cells
Carlisle and Penrith	1
Carmarthenshire	3
Ceredigion	1
Powys	2
Pembrokeshire	2
Western North Wales	1
North Northumberland	1
South-West Northumberland	1
Hereford	1

- 304.** Comparison would suggest that the Force should be considering amalgamating its intelligence cells in centralised locations. Given the clear links with BCU strategic planning evident in the NIM, it may be more appropriate to provide single, and enhanced, intelligence cells centred on divisional headquarters. This would make each intelligence cell more flexible and increase capacity to produce the full range of products required by the NIM.

Area for Development	Options for Change
Amalgamation/ rationalisation of BCU intelligence resources	<p>Option 1: Do nothing. Smaller and individual cells have closer links with their immediate area but reduced capacity to produce a full range of intelligence products.</p> <p>Option 2: Divisional Commanders should review their direct operational requirements of intelligence and the capacity to provide the intelligence products required by the NIM (by April 2004).</p>

Recommendation 16	Divisional Commanders to review direct operational requirements of intelligence and local capacity (including analytical requirements) to provide NIM intelligence products by April 2004.
Financial Benefit	Opportunity costs.
Other Benefits	Potential efficiency, effectiveness and economy savings through rationalisation of intelligence resources.

Performance Management

Individual Performance

- 305. In relation to intelligence logs (C600b) consultation identified local practices whereby the submission of intelligence logs was being monitored as a measure of performance. From anecdotal evidence, in particular, some officers were being set targets of submitting at least one intelligence log a month. This is less a measure of performance or quality than activity or quantity.
- 306. Where this practice was implemented two things appeared to happen. Firstly, the volume of logs submitted increased. Secondly, the quality of intelligence submitted dropped. Together these factors served to 'bog down' local intelligence cells who quickly became immersed in sorting out the 'wheat from the chaff.'
- 307. To be useful, intelligence has to be accurate and timely. There is no specific requirement for volume. To be used as an indicator of performance activity the emphasis on intelligence logs should be on quality not quantity.
- 308. Force CMRD guidance on the management of proactivity includes, among its performance measures for C2 staff, the number of intelligence logs submitted in relation to individuals currently being examined as Force targets. The BVRT would highlight this as good practice.
- 309. If the provision of intelligence is to be used as an indicator of officer activity, then it is imperative that a link is made to existing section, BCU and Force priorities.

The Performance of Intelligence Units

- 310. There are no national or corporate Best Value Performance Indicators that relate to intelligence specifically. Each BCU intelligence cell and HQ FIB record a range of activities but there is limited consistency across the Force.
- 311. Specifically lacking for intelligence cells is a set of indicators providing direct measurement of the impact of intelligence driven activity in relation to Force objectives. Where indicators exist they tend to focus on short-term outcomes.
- 312. For example, one BCU records the number of Bronze Target packages drafted by the intelligence cell and notes how many result in an arrest in a particular category (such as drugs or traffic offences) or result in a warrant being issued. While an indicator

such as this tells you about the activity carried out by the intelligence cell it does not inform you whether the activity has resulted in a drop in local crime. Indeed the results, arrests or warrants, are outside the direct control of the intelligence cell and are reliant upon the performance of other teams.

- 313. Dyfed-Powys is not alone in this. Comparison with other force intelligence cells has also highlighted poor use of activity indicators in place of performance ones with emphasis on quantities rather than qualities.
- 314. The essence of the NIM is efficient, effective, economic and focussed team working. It is a tool geared to provide a framework for managing the business of policing at identified geographical levels. The outcomes of the use of the NIM, and therefore the performance outcomes of those with a role in the model's processes are:
 - ✓ Community Safety,
 - ✓ Reduced Crime,
 - ✓ Controlled Criminality and
 - ✓ Controlled Disorder.
- 315. It could therefore be suggested that the most appropriate way to measure the performance of an intelligence cell, in company with the uniform, pro-active, community safety, roads policing and all the other officers and staff working in a particular area, would be to focus on the actual business issues.
- 316. Instead of counting the number of target packages for burglary that result in an arrest, for example, performance may be better measured through assessment of crime levels. Operational commanders should be monitoring and focusing on questions like 'has burglary dropped since we adopted the anti-burglary action plan that used the target profile provided by the FIO, the crime pattern analysis from the analyst, the target hardening leaflet drop from the Community Safety Officer, the targeted patrol conducted by the beat officers and the arrest made by the pro-active team.
- 317. The Force Management Information Unit already provides the key information needed, by area managers, to assess the effectiveness of local policing activity.

Area for Development	Options for Change
Education of managers to encourage more efficient, effective and economic use of performance management.	<p>Option 1: Do nothing.</p> <p>Option 2: Use the Force Management Information Bulletin exclusively as a corporate performance measurement suite. This is to measure activity relevant to local policing.</p>

Recommendation 17	Use the Force Management Information Bulletin exclusively as a corporate performance measurement suite. This is to measure activity relevant to local policing.
Financial Benefit	Potential opportunity savings for lower to middle managers.
Other Benefits	Potential efficiency and effectiveness savings

Notes

Conclusions

- 318.** Unlike many forces, Dyfed-Powys chose not to establish a full project team to oversee the process of introduction and development of the NIM across the Force. Although the NCIS NIM Implementation Team noted this situation, they also commented that development of the model within the Force had not been obstructed by it.
- 319.** The Deputy Chief Constable is noted as having oversight of NIM implementation.
- 320.** Implementation, to date, has focused on the procedures and products required by the NIM. For example, BCU CSOs have been recently tasked to provide intelligence products required by the NIM. Likewise, Force guidance on the NIM has provided explanations of the terminology and structures required by the NIM.
- 321.** What has not been fundamentally tackled, to date, are the actual resource implications full compliance with the NIM will require. This is particularly the case in relation to Divisional and HQ analytical capacity.
- 322.** It has been advanced that the levels of crime within Dyfed-Powys are not sufficient to justify the full range of intelligence resources required by the NIM. This is true, but only if one narrowly considers the NIM as just a crime intelligence model.
- 323.** While the NIM offers superb potential to deal with crime matters, it offers equal potential to deal with all aspects of operational policing. ACPO, NCIS, the Superintendents Association and the Home Office have all underlined that NIM is a tool to provide a 'Best Value' approach to tackling core functions.
- 324.** The BVRT would endorse the full use of the NIM as a management tool within the Force. The use of the NIM has repercussions beyond HQ CMRD and BCU proactive teams and intelligence cells, which is where the focus is currently. As such, it is incumbent upon the Force to fully assess the value of the NIM to bring about positive and significant change across the whole organisation.
- 325.** The Force has, however, developed a strong foundation upon which the NIM can be implemented in full across the Force. This is due, in no small part, to the dedication and vision exhibited by those officers and support staff engaged in the intelligence process.

Appendix A Review Details

The Best Value Review Team convened for this review consisted of:

Detective Inspector Ian Griffith of Headquarters CMRD (Review Head)

Mrs Ena Taylor of the Police Authority (Police Authority Member)

Mr Declan McHenry of the Best Value Unit (Researcher).

Chief Inspector Mark Collins (Critical Friend)

The Best Value Programme Board agreed the terms of reference for the review on 16 January 2002. In April 2002 Mr McHenry took over responsibility for managing the Force Best Value Programme in addition to providing the research for this review. Research was completed at the end of August 2002. The review was held over to examine links with the Community Safety Best Value Review.

In total, 53 research days were dedicated to the review.

Appendix B
Crime Support Officer – Job Description

Designation: Divisional Crime Support Officer
Grade: Scale 4
Responsible to: Detective Inspector

Job Purpose:

Under the direction of the Detective Inspector to identify and analyse patterns of crime and to prepare crime pattern analysis/intelligence packages on problem areas and target criminals.

Job Activities:

1. To undertake the daily research of the Crime Systems and other databases to identify crime series, trends, offenders and patterns, and including forensic evidence evaluation.
2. To conduct crime pattern analysis and telephone analysis to ensure early identification of crime trends, patterns and offenders, in support of national, Force and divisional objectives.
3. To assist the Detective Inspector by preparing necessary documentation in respect of informant handling, divisional meetings, technical support utilisation, target packages etc.
4. To ensure Force policy is complied with (R/O 50/93) and the involvement of CID in non-recordable offences, undertaking research and providing logistical support.
5. To assist the Detective Inspector in ensuring quality of service internally and externally in maximising opportunities for media coverage.
6. To undertake general administrative duties in support of the criminal investigation function.
7. To comply with Force policies on Equal Opportunities, Health and Safety, Data Protection and Information Security, the requirements of the Human Rights Act 1998 and in accordance with force guidance documents and protocols.

Appendix C

Local Intelligence Clerk - Job Description

Ref: Personnel-JD/C-DivCID 29/09/98

(a) Identifying Facts

Designation: Clerk

Division/Location: Divisional CID Office

(b) Job Purpose

To provide clerical support to Divisional Detective Inspectors and their staff, thereby freeing Police Officers to perform their primary functions.

(c) Major Tasks

- ✓ Filing of crime reports and associated documents.
- ✓ Monitoring of documents returned for remedial action/additional enquiries etc.
- ✓ Monitoring the submission of outstanding documents as above.
- ✓ Locating and copying documents to satisfy disclosure requirements on Prosecution files.
- ✓ Administrative functions relating to functions requiring records to be maintained *including entering intelligence logs on CIS system*⁴⁷.
- ✓ Monitoring the circulation and filing of instructional documents, memorandums, Orders etc.
- ✓ Managing telephone enquiries in the absence of CID officers.
- ✓ Maintaining abstractions register and preparation of duty rosters.
- ✓ Initial dealings with correspondence.

(d) Work Activities

All work carried out by the post holder is confidential in nature.

Filing of Crime Report and Associated Documents

The post holder will be required to file the C551, C551A and C552 documents in the required manner, together with any additional documents such as statements, SOCO documents, further reports, as appropriate. The post holder must ensure that all documents are filed in the correct location to ensure ease of retrieval.

⁴⁷ BVRT emphasis.

Monitoring of Remedial Action/Additional Enquiry Reports

The post holder will be required to monitor requests from and returns to Headquarters Statistics Department and remedial action to be taken. Regarding crime reports previously faxed to Headquarters. Additionally, they will be required to monitor the returns to the Detective Inspector of those reports requested by way of a C553, ensuring that such reports are submitted in the prescribed period.

Monitoring Submission of Outstanding Crime Reports

The post holder will be required to periodically compare the hard copy crime reports filed on Division with the data on the LCS computer, so as to ensure that all data on that computer is up to date and accurate.

File Disclosure Requirements

The post holder will be expected to locate and copy all crime reports and associated documents to ensure compliance with file disclosure requirements.

Production of Statistical Returns


The post holder will be required to produce regular and occasional statistical returns from the LCS computer, for the use of the OCD, DI, Community Safety Department etc, with periodic checks to ensure accuracy.

Appendix D
Comparative Basic Command Units⁴⁸

Basic Command Unit (HMIC Family 12)	Population	Officers
Carlisle and Penrith	152,622	311.8
Carmarthenshire	169,100	333.7
Ceredigion	72,200	150.8
Powys	114,700	233.6
Pembrokeshire	126,800	253.6
Western North Wales	181,800	345.0
North Northumberland	57,033	121.0
South-West Northumberland	62,639	116.0
Hereford	167,581	252.7

Basic Command Unit	Crimes per 1,000 Population			
	All Crime	Domestic Burglary	Vehicle Crime	Public Disorder
Carlisle and Penrith	91.2	12.0	11.2	70.7
Carmarthenshire	62.3	4.7	6.1	40.3
Ceredigion	43.2	3.0	3.2	33.2
Powys	46.1	3.7	3.3	38.7
Pembrokeshire	39.9	2.6	3.3	35.6
Western North Wales	66.5	4.4	7.8	33.3
North Northumberland	46.6	5.3	5.4	71.6
South-West Northumberland	44.2	5.3	4.8	44.5
Hereford	88	12.1	10.5	44.9

⁴⁸ All figures are for the period 2001-2002.



	Crimes per 1,000 Population			
	All Crime	Domestic Burglary	Vehicle Crime	Public Disorder
■ Hereford	88	12.1	10.5	44.9
□ South-West Northumberland	44.2	5.3	4.8	44.5
■ North Northumberland	46.6	5.3	5.4	71.6
■ Western North Wales	66.5	4.4	7.8	33.3
■ Pembrokeshire	39.9	2.6	3.3	35.6
□ Powys	46.1	3.7	3.3	38.7
□ Ceredigion	43.2	3	3.2	33.2
■ Carmarthenshire	62.3	4.7	6.1	40.3
■ Carlisle and Penrith	91.2	12	11.2	70.7

Appendix E Survey Questions

Constables

Q1 How familiar are you with the Dyfed-Powys Police document, 'A Simple Guide to the Intelligence Process?'

Very familiar Fairly familiar A little Not at all

Q2 In relation to intelligence logs (C600b), how confident are you at correctly grading the following areas?:

	Very confident	Fairly confident	Not confident
Evaluating Sources	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Evaluating Intelligence	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Identifying a Handling Code	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Q3 How confident are you with the concept of Provenance in relation to intelligence logs?

Very Confident Fairly confident Not confident at all Don't know

Q4 Have you ever had difficulty making any of the following checks prior to submitting an intelligence log?

	Yes	No
CIS Check	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
PNC Person	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
PNC Vehicle	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
PNC TE Enquiry	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
PNC VODS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Firearms Check	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Q5 If you answered yes to any check in Q4 please state why you consider you had difficulty.

Q6 Do you ever personally act on the intelligence you submit?

Yes No

Q7 In your opinion how effective are the following ways of spreading intelligence:

	Very effective	generally effective	not really effective
Verbal briefing	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Daily Intranet bulletin	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Briefing sheets	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Intelligence Cell Intranet pages	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

- Q8 How often do you submit intelligence logs?
- Daily
 - Weekly
 - Fortnightly
 - Monthly
 - Once every couple of months
 - Never

- Q9 Have you heard of the National Intelligence Model?
- Yes No

- Q10 How effective do you consider the work undertaken by your local intelligence cell?
- Very effective Never effective
 - Generally effective Don't know
 - Rarely effective

Q11 What, in your opinion, is the worst aspect of current intelligence procedures?

Q12 What, in your opinion, is the best aspect of current intelligence procedures?

Q13 What is your current role?

Uniformed Constable Detective Constable

Q14 Are you working, or have you ever worked, in a pro-active team (including C2) or an intelligence cell?

Yes No

Q15 Where do you work?

Headquarters

Carmarthenshire BCU

Ceredigion BCU

Pembrokeshire BCU

Powys BCU

Sergeants and Above

Q1 How familiar are you with the Dyfed-Powys Police document, 'A Simple Guide to the Intelligence Process?'

Very familiar Fairly familiar A little Not at all

Q2 In relation to intelligence logs (C600b), how confident are you at correctly grading the following areas?:

	Very confident	Fairly confident	Not confident
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Evaluating Intelligence	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Identifying a Handling Code	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

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Q4 Have you ever had difficulty making any of the following checks prior to submitting an intelligence log?

	Yes	No
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PNC Person	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
PNC Vehicle	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

PNC TE Enquiry	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
PNC VODS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
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Briefing sheets	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Intelligence Cell Intranet pages	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

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Never

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Yes No


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Q13 What is your current role?

Uniformed Constable

Detective Constable

Q14 Are you working, or have you ever worked, in a pro-active team (including C2) or an intelligence cell?

Yes

No

Q15 Where do you work?

Headquarters

Carmarthenshire BCU

Ceredigion BCU

Pembrokeshire BCU

Powys BCU

Intelligence:
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